UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2479th MEETING: 22 SEPTEMBER 1983

NEW YORK

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NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/ . . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

2479th MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 22 September 1983, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Noel G. SINCLAIR (Guyana).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2479)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. Admission of new Members:
   Letter dated 19 September 1983 from the Prime Minister of Saint Christopher and Nevis addressed to the Secretary-General (S/15989)

The meeting was called to order at 3.50 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Admission of new Members:
Letter dated 19 September 1983 from the Prime Minister of Saint Christopher and Nevis addressed to the Secretary-General (S/15989)

1. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Ecuador in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite the representative of Ecuador to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: The Council will now consider the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of Saint Christopher and Nevis for membership in the United Nations [*S/15997*]. In paragraph 3 of its report, the Committee has recommended that the Council have recourse to the provisions of the last paragraph of rule 60 of its provisional rules of procedure, in view of the fact that the General Assembly is currently in session. I take it that it is so decided.

3. I take it that the Council is ready to vote on the draft resolution contained in the Committee's report. Accordingly, I now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in paragraph 4 of the Committee's report concerning the application of Saint Christopher and Nevis for membership in the United Nations.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

The draft resolution was adopted unanimously [resolution 537 (1983)].

4. The PRESIDENT: I shall immediately convey this decision to the Secretary-General for transmission to the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of rule 60 of the provisional rules of procedure.

5. A number of representatives have inscribed their names on the list of speakers following the voting. The first such speaker is the representative of the United Kingdom, on whom I now call.

6. Sir John THOMSON (United Kingdom): One of the pleasantest duties that falls to a member of the Security Council to perform, and one that is also an honour, is to congratulate States which have recently attained their independence and to welcome their admission to the United Nations. It gives me particular pleasure to do so in the case of Saint Christopher and Nevis, with which the United Kingdom has been bound by close ties of friendship stretching back more than 350 years.

7. The Island's link with Britain in fact began in 1623, when the first British colony in the West Indian islands was established on Saint Christopher. For most of their history, Saint Christopher and Nevis was administered as part of the Leeward Islands. In 1956, with the abolition of the Federation of the Leeward Islands, Saint Christopher and Nevis and Anguilla became a separate dependency.

8. In 1967, the United Kingdom created six Associated States in the Eastern Caribbean as a transitional stage to full independence, retaining responsibility only for defence and certain aspects of external affairs. The accession of Saint Christopher and Nevis to independence on 19 September of this year—Anguilla having separated in 1980—was therefore of particular significance: it was the last of those six territories to become independent, following in

the footsteps of Grenada in 1974, Dominica and Saint Lucia in 1978, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979 and Antigua and Barbuda in 1981.

9. The status of Association with Britain negotiated in 1967 was from the outset voluntary and terminable at any time at the request of the Associated State. As in the case of the other Associated States, the Government of Saint Christopher and Nevis requested the British Government to terminate the Associated status through an Order in Council. The British Government took the view that it was right to take such action provided it was satisfied that the majority of the people had agreed that the status of Association should be terminated and that the proposed independence constitution made proper provision for fundamental rights and the rule of law. The British Government, satisfied that these conditions had been met, agreed to the request of the Saint Christopher and Nevis Government that the status of Association should be terminated. Parliament approved orders to this effect in May of this year, and these were subsequently signed by Queen Elizabeth II on 22 June.

10. The Government of Saint Christopher and Nevis has made commendable strides in economic development. Agriculture is the main economic activity; manufacturing is now the dominant sector in terms of providing new employment opportunities. Tourism is also becoming a major growth area. The Government is actively encouraging private investment in manufacturing enterprises. The Government has received development assistance both through direct bilateral aid from the United Kingdom and from the World Bank, the European Development Fund and the Caribbean Development Bank.

11. The independence celebrations that took place in Saint Christopher and Nevis last week were attended by the Princess Margaret and the Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Raison. They marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Saint Christopher and Nevis. The enthusiasm of the inhabitants and their obvious delight at the attainment of a new political status augur well for the future and the challenges that lie ahead. I am confident that Saint Christopher and Nevis will go from strength to strength as an independent State and that they will be able to count on the support and succour both of this Organization and of its Member States, support that will be so vital, particularly in the early days of nationhood.

12. The United Nations for its part can only benefit from the membership of Saint Christopher and Nevis and the fresh ideas which its Government will bring to our deliberations. I am therefore delighted that the Council has decided unanimously to recommend to the General Assembly the admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis. We very much look forward to welcoming its representatives to New York.

13. Mr. LOUET (France) (*interpretation from French*): It was with particular pleasure that my delegation voted in favour of the admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis to membership of the United Nations. Indeed, in welcoming this new State today, just a few days after its accession to independence, the Organization is once again demonstrating its belief in the principle of universality, and we are very glad of this.

14. Furthermore, France has always had excellent relations as good neighbours with the peoples of that country, and we hope that the decision the Council has just taken will enable us to develop these relations even further.

15. Finally, Saint Christopher and Nevis has undertaken to discharge the obligations set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. We have no doubt but that this commitment will enable it to make its contribution to the Organization's efforts in support of peace and development.

16. My country welcomes this opportunity today to offer its best wishes for the happiness and well-being of the peoples of this new State.

17. Mr. LING Qing (China) (*interpretation from Chinese*): We are happy to see that Saint Christopher and Nevis, a beautiful island country in the Caribbean, proclaimed its independence on 19 September 1983, thus joining the ranks of the independent States of the world. This is the result of the long struggles waged by the people of Saint Christopher and Nevis and a new victory in the whole struggle of decolonization. The Chinese delegation would like to take this opportunity to express its warm congratulations to the Government and people of Saint Christopher and Nevis and sincerely wish Saint Christopher and Nevis prosperity and its people well-being.

18. The Chinese delegation is delighted to welcome today the application of Saint Christopher and Nevis for admission to membership in the United Nations and endorses the recommendation of the Security Council to the General Assembly for admitting Saint Christopher and Nevis to membership in the United Nations.

19. We have persistently maintained that all countries in the world, irrespective of their size, can play their own parts in international affairs. We believe that, upon admission to membership in the United Nations, Saint Christopher and Nevis will, together with all other peace-loving and justice-upholding countries of the world, make positive contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security and the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

20. On the occasion of the proclamation of the independence of Saint Christopher and Nevis, Premier Zhao Ziyang of the State Council of the People's Republic of China sent a message to Prime Minister Kennedy Simmonds, extending heartfelt congratulations of the Chinese Government and people to the Government and people of Saint Christopher and Nevis and announcing the decision of the Chinese Government to recognize Saint Christopher and Nevis. Both China and Saint Christopher and Nevis are third-world countries. Our two peoples had similar experiences in the past and are now facing the same task of building their countries. It is our earnest hope that the relations between our two countries and the friendship

between our two peoples will witness constant development in the future.

21. Mr. OVINNIKOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): The delegation of the Soviet Union notes with satisfaction the statement by Saint Christopher and Nevis that it accepts the commitments set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and also its formal undertaking to abide by those commitments. The Soviet delegation supported the recommendation of the Council for the admission of that State to membership in the United Nations.

22. On the day of the proclamation of the independence of the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis, the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union sent to the Prime Minister of that country, Mr. Kennedy Simmonds, a cablegram stating as follows:

> "On the occasion of the proclamation of the independence of the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis, please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, our sincere congratulations and our best wishes for the prosperity and success of your people as you move along the path of independent national development.
>
> "The Soviet Government, constantly guided by the principles of equality and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, hereby declares that it recognizes the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis as an independent and sovereign State and expresses its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it."

The Soviet delegation would like to take this opportunity to address our warmest congratulations to this newly independent State and to its people.

23. Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): I have great pleasure in expressing, through our positive vote in favour of the recommendation in the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members [*ibid.*], our support for the admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis to membership in the United Nations. On behalf of the Government of Pakistan and my delegation, I warmly welcome the entry of Saint Christopher and Nevis into the fold of the international community. The Government of the United Kingdom deserves congratulations for taking the necessary steps to facilitate the independence of Saint Christopher and Nevis and its membership in the United Nations.

24. We rejoice in the independence of Saint Christopher and Nevis and greet its people, who are entering a new phase in their history as a free nation poised to devote its energy to the cause of peace and progress. We are confident that Saint Christopher and Nevis will play an active role in the United Nations, making its valuable contribution towards the advancement of the principles and purposes of the Organization. In this common endeavour, Pakistan greatly looks forward to the establishment of friendly relations with Saint Christopher and Nevis and the development of fruitful co-operation and contacts with its delegation at the United Nations. The admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis will enhance the universality of the United Nations, which indeed is the intrinsic strength and the unique hallmark of the Organization.

25. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): Mr. President, it must be a source of special pleasure to you that the unanimous recommendation for the admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis, a fellow Caribbean country, should occur under your presidency. We, too, from the Mediterranean, are delighted to speak briefly in favour of the admission of this new island State to membership in the United Nations.

26. Apart from contributing further to the universality of the Organization, the new applicant augments the ranks of the Commonwealth and of the small developing island countries, now almost 50 in number, just under a third of the entire membership of the United Nations. I have noted with admiration the solemn undertaking given by the Prime Minister on behalf of his country, accepting all the rights and duties of membership. As another small country with only a relatively brief history of independence behind us, we welcome in particular the abiding faith in the United Nations evidenced by small countries, especially against a background of unhelpful onslaughts against the Organization that sometimes hit the headlines. Therefore we rejoice that one more voice will be heard in the halls and corridors of the United Nations staunchly upholding the imperatives of development and peace.

27. Malta and Saint Christopher and Nevis have much in common. Sharing their ideals and their aspirations, my delegation looks forward to a long and fruitful collaboration with the newly independent nation of Saint Christopher and Nevis, and we shall be honoured, as a first step, to co-sponsor the draft resolution on its admission as a Member of the General Assembly, with the same warm feelings of solidarity and friendship as we express in the Council today.

28. We should like to extend a word of praise to the Government of the United Kingdom for the practical help it has extended in acceding to the wishes of the inhabitants of Saint Christopher and Nevis in their peaceful quest for independence after such a long association in the past.

29. We are very pleased to share in this moment of history, on the accession of a new country to independence and in a unanimous recommendation of the Council for admission to membership in the United Nations, which is certain to be implemented. We extend warm congratulations to the people and Government of Saint Christopher and Nevis.

30. Mr. NATORF (Poland): It is with profound satisfaction that the Polish delegation has supported the recommendation of the Security Council that Saint Christopher and Nevis be admitted to membership of the United Nations.

31. We have studied carefully the letter dated 19 September 1983 from the Prime Minister of Saint Christopher and Nevis, Mr. Kennedy Simmonds, to the Secretary-General, noting in particular his declaration that the newly born

nation accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and solemnly declares its readiness to fulfil them.

32. The delegation of Poland welcomes the application, being firmly convinced that the admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis to the United Nations will strengthen the principle of equal rights and the right to self-determination of peoples as well as the principle of universality of the Organization.

33. Poland will be happy to see Saint Christopher and Nevis a Member of the United Nations international community.

34. Mr. MEESMAN (Netherlands): As a representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I have much pleasure in joining those who have welcomed the application for membership in the Organization of this new State. It goes without saying that we had no difficulty whatsoever in supporting the recommendation in paragraph 4 of the report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members [*ibid.*].

35. As the Council knows, my country has always attached great importance to the principle of universality of the United Nations, and we are therefore grateful to note that one of the first acts of the newly established sovereign nation of Saint Christopher and Nevis has been the decision to apply for membership of the Organization. Moreover, we are confident that this new Member, with which the Kingdom of the Netherlands hopes to continue to maintain good-neighbourly relations, will fulfil the requirements for membership: namely that it is able and willing to carry out its obligations under the Charter. We are particularly glad that the Council has unanimously decided to recommend Saint Christopher and Nevis for membership of the United Nations and thereby to pave the way for its admission to the community of nations.

36. May I conclude by extending our warm congratulations to the people and Government of our new Member.

37. Mr. TINOCO FONSECA (Nicaragua) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Nicaragua would like to express its satisfaction at the attainment of independence by Saint Christopher and Nevis, with all the more emphasis in view of our position as a Latin American country member of the Council, country of Central America, a region which has very close historical ties of friendship and co-operation with the community of countries to which this new State belongs. This represents a further step in the as yet incomplete process of decolonization in Latin America.

38. We are convinced that in enlarging the Caribbean community, Saint Christopher and Nevis will contribute to the important role which the countries of the Caribbean play in the international arena.

39. This new State emerges at a time and in a region where there is political upheaval caused by social inequalities, precarious economic conditions and lack of respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. We trust that the common sense of its leaders and the ideological pluralism which has characterized the family of nations to which it belongs are two important elements that will make this new State an important factor for peace and balance in the region.

40. The natural trend of Latin American countries to non-alignment will be strengthened by the decision of this new sister country to become a Member of the United Nations. We are fully confident that in this new condition, added to that of an independent Latin American State, it will abide fully by the obligations of the Charter and spare no effort to ensure the achievement of the great and important objectives of the Organization.

41. Mr. CLARK (United States of America): As the oldest new nation and the first former British colony in this Western hemisphere to gain its independence, the United States warmly congratulates Saint Christopher and Nevis on its independence and welcomes it to the ranks of the nations of the Americas. In our capacity as host country to the United Nations, we welcome the representatives of Saint Christopher and Nevis to New York, and as a fellow Member we welcome Saint Christopher and Nevis to the United Nations.

42. Mr. ADJOYI (Togo) (*interpretation from French*): The Government and people of Togo welcomed the accession to independence of Saint Christopher and Nevis on 19 September.

43. The application for admission to membership, which was duly filed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Kennedy Simmonds, was not, in the view of my delegation, a mere formality. It demonstrated the faith of that young State in the United Nations and its determination to bring to the Organization the optimism which the Organization is beginning to lack. The admission to the Organization of Saint Christopher and Nevis will strengthen our vocation of universality and help our work. My delegation therefore voted in favour of the recommendation for admission which the Council is making to the General Assembly.

44. In conclusion, my delegation would like once again to salute this new sister State of Saint Christopher and Nevis and wish it every success in its contribution to our common search for a world of peace, a world of solidarity, in short, the better world to which we all aspire.

45. Mr. CHIKETA (Zimbabwe): It is always a great occasion for my country when any part of the colonized world is granted independence. There are many more people who remain under the yoke of colonialism and imperialism. The attainment of independence by Saint Christopher and Nevis demonstrates the efficacy of the United Nations as an instrument of liberation of peoples all over the world. I am sure that we speak for all oppressed persons when we say that the freedom of Saint Christopher and Nevis serves as an inspiration to those that have yet to be granted independence.

46. We look forward to the day when certain members of the Security Council will facilitate the arrival of the occasion for us to admit a new independent State of Namibia. We welcome the independence of Saint Christopher and Nevis and we take this opportunity to congratulate its people. My Government stands ready to co-operate with the independent State in the pursuance of the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

47. Mr. MAPANGO ma KEMISHANGA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): The admission of Saint Christopher and Nevis to the United Nations which the Security Council has just decided to recommend to the General Assembly is closely related to the policy of decolonization and the emancipation of peoples enshrined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and to the universal character of the Organization. Therefore, my delegation joins those whose representatives have already spoken in welcoming the Council's positive vote, which embodies the international community's determination to be enriched quantitatively as well as qualitatively, to the benefit of the ideals of peace and security.

48. I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate most warmly, on behalf of my Government, the valiant people of Saint Christopher and Nevis and its Government, and to wish them every success in the great family that is the United Nations.

49. Mr. BURAYZAT (Jordan) (*interpretation from Arabic*): The delegation of Jordan wishes to state that it welcomes the recommendation that Saint Christopher and Nevis be admitted as a member of the United Nations. We feel great satisfaction in congratulating this young State upon its independence, since the declaration of independence by the people of Saint Christopher and Nevis on 19 September is but an expression of a principle that is dear to us all and to Jordan in particular—the principle of self-determination. The representative of Zimbabwe mentioned one people which still awaits the implementation of this principle, and I believe that other people await the implementation of the same principle.

50. The declaration by the Prime Minister of Saint Christopher and Nevis that his State will abide by the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations gives us great satisfaction. We believe that declaration was made at the right place and at the right time.

51. We look forward to establishing the best possible relations with this new State. That is why Jordan was among those States that supported the draft resolution that Saint Christopher and Nevis be admitted as a member of the United Nations.

52. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Ecuador. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

53. Mr. ALBORNOZ (Ecuador) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I thank you, Mr. President, and members of the Council, for the opportunity that you have given me to speak in this forum on behalf of the Group of Latin American States at the United Nations, which I have the honour to preside over, in order to congratulate the Council on the unanimous adoption of the resolution and to welcome Saint Christopher and Nevis, a country which comes to strengthen the universality of the Organization, bringing the total number of members to 158 when the resolution is adopted in the General Assembly, and increasing the number of members of the Latin American Group to 33.

54. The cause of the eradication of colonialism has been a characteristic of Latin America, both in its 20 years of struggle to achieve independence in the nineteenth century and in the firm and tenacious action of those Latin Americans who in our generation drafted the San Francisco Charter or those who are today members of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

55. Thus, 92 countries have already gained independence since then and have become Members of the United Nations. Twelve countries—today 13—have been added to the original group of 20 Latin American founding fathers of the Organization.

56. Saint Christopher and Nevis is not an unknown, far-away country. It is older in world geography than almost all the other American countries. The islands of the Lesser Antilles were discovered during the second voyage of Admiral Christopher Columbus. This successful landing during his first voyage, on 12 October 1492, led to his fame and to support from the Crown, which enabled him to organize a major expedition, this time with 17 vessels. During this expedition, upon returning to the Antilles, when he sailed past islands on his way to the island of Espaniola—today the Dominican Republic—he brought the Leeward Islands to the notice of the rest of the world on 12 November 1493.

57. To the first island where Columbus was able to find safe shelter to drop anchor he originally gave the name St. Martín, but it was later dedicated to Our Lady of the Snows, the object of an old Roman religious devotion, a name which has survived as the Anglicized "Nevis".

58. It was from the island of Nevis that he saw the other three islands—St. George, later called St. Christopher in honour of the saint whose name he bore, known in English today as St. Kitts; Statia, dedicated to St. Anastasia, and later St. Eustatius; and Saba.

59. All these islands are part of our reality and also part of our legend. For the peoples of Latin America, the Caribbean is the *Mare Nostrum* of our history. This is where the known dimensions of the planet were reshaped; from here began the expeditions of discovery and colonization of the countries of the whole American continent, today independent.

60. The presence of indigenous Caribbean and Spanish, French, English, Dutch and African elements in those islands gives a wondrous content to a history rich in universal contributions and is a symbol of the great blending

of races, free from discrimination, which gives vigour and grace to the great mixture of the human resources of Latin America.

61. The Latin American community at the United Nations welcomes with open arms the new brother country of Saint Christopher and Nevis. We express our warm wishes for its prosperity and happiness, and we are ready to offer it the co-operation of the bodies, services and programmes of the system of the Organization, together with the solidarity and affection which are the hallmarks of our Latin American world.

62. The PRESIDENT: As there are no further speakers on my list, I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of GUYANA.

63. It is with a feeling of special pride that Guyana participates in this consideration by the Council of the application for membership to the United Nations by Saint Christopher and Nevis, inasmuch as this State is from our Commonwealth and in the Caribbean subregion, and Guyana shares with it a common bond of history.

64. Along with these common historical ties, geography and a close cultural identity have destined Saint Christopher and Nevis and Guyana to have close fraternal co-operation. This co-operation is manifested particularly in our subregional organization, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), where our two States labour together with our neighbours to increase our collective strength.

65. In our Caribbean Community therefore, Saint Christopher and Nevis has long been considered a full member, and we have always respected it as such. In saluting the attainment of formal independence by Saint Christopher and Nevis, my country's President expressed the view that CARICOM would undoubtedly be strengthened by the islands' new status. "Guyana looks forward", he said, "to our continuing collaboration with Saint Christopher and Nevis in a common cause of regional integration".

66. Guyana is committed to the goal of universality of membership of the United Nations, and it is our belief that it is through the full participation of all States in the deliberations of the Organization that the international community can best attain those goals which the overwhelming majority of nations justly strive for—peace, justice, prosperity—goals which should be the corner-stone of all human endeavour. We are satisfied that the application by Saint Christopher and Nevis for membership in the United Nations conforms to the requirements of Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations. My delegation is therefore delighted that the Security Council has decided unanimously to recommend acceptance of the application of Saint Christopher and Nevis and stands ready to welcome this new State to our midst. We are confident that Saint Christopher and Nevis will make a valuable contribution to the work of the Organization, in accordance with the Charter, and we look forward to working in close co-operation with the delegation of that State in our joint effort to grapple with the problems that confront the world today. It is our firm hope and expectation that the bonds of friendship which bind us will be further strengthened by that co-operation.

67. In joining the Organization, Saint Christopher and Nevis will fall under the protection of the Charter. This, therefore, gives rise to particular duties for all Member States, the first of which is the guarantee to this newly independent country of full enjoyment of its sovereign rights: its territorial integrity, its security, its political and economic autonomy, as well as its right to development.

68. In closing, I reiterate the sincere congratulations of the Government and the people of Guyana to the Government and the people of our newly independent sister State. We wish it every success in its task of nation building.

69. As PRESIDENT of the Council, I declare that the Council has now concluded its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—January 1992—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2480th MEETING: 18 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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2480th MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 18 October 1983, at 12.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2480)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in the Middle East:
   Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16036)

The meeting was called to order at 12.40 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): As this is the first meeting of the Council for the month of October, I should like to pay a tribute, on behalf of the Council, to the President for the month of September, Mr. Noel Sinclair, representative of Guyana, for the great diplomatic skill and courtesy with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/16036)

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Lebanon, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Turk (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): Members of the Council have before them the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for the period from 13 July to 12 October 1983. They also have before them document S/16046, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

4. I call on the representative of Lebanon.

5. Mr. TURK (Lebanon) (*interpretation from Arabic*): Mr. President, allow me to extend congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency for the month of October. I am confident that your personality, your ability and your experience in the political and diplomatic fields will enable you to guide the Council in the carrying out of the duties entrusted to it.

6. I should like to take this opportunity to express appreciation for the efforts made by your predecessor, the President for last month, Mr. Sinclair, to ensure that the Council assume its natural role for bringing peace to Lebanon.

7. I also have pleasure in expressing to the Secretary-General appreciation and thanks for his constant interest in everything relating to Lebanon and also for the report he has submitted to the Council on 12 October in which, in response to the request by the Government of Lebanon, he has recommended an extension of the mandate of UNIFIL for six months without any changes in its duties as set forth in Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).

8. The presence of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, as pointed out in the report of the Secretary-General, is a consecration of the United Nations commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon and to the assurance of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the south, in accordance with Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 509 (1982). Furthermore, that international presence constitutes a fundamental factor for stability in the region.

9. Approval of the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate for a further six months would enable the Lebanese authorities to restore legitimacy in the south up to the internationally recognized boundaries and to find solutions to bring about the withdrawal of all unauthorized forces from all Lebanese territory.

10. In presenting on behalf of my Government the request to renew the mandate of UNIFIL in southern Leb-

anon as defined in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), for a six-month period, I should like to put on record our thanks to all the members of the Council for their understanding of our cause and for their position on it. I should like also to extend special thanks, on behalf of the Government and people of Lebanon, to the countries participating in UNIFIL for the effective role played by their contingents in southern Lebanon. Similarly, I wish to record Lebanon's thanks, satisfaction and appreciation to the international forces in the south, and to their Commander, Lieutenant-General William Callaghan, as well as to the troops and civil servants stationed there for their contribution, sacrifices and service in most difficult and often extremely dangerous circumstances.

11. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of Lebanon for the kind words he addressed to me.

12. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it [*S/16046*]. Unless I hear any objection, I shall now put the draft resolution to the vote.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions [resolution 536 (1983)].

13. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I shall now call upon those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the vote.

14. Mr. van der STOEL (Netherlands): I should like first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Council. Your wisdom and wide experience are well known. There are few who are so well qualified for this difficult task as you.

15. When the Council discussed the mandate of UNIFIL in July of this year [*2456th meeting*], I had been instructed to inform the Council that the Netherlands UNIFIL battalion, barring entirely new circumstances which would enable my Government to reconsider its position, would be withdrawn from Lebanon as from 19 October. At the same time, we indicated our willingness to remain in close contact with the Government of Lebanon, with the Secretary-General and with our friends in UNIFIL and with all other parties concerned to assess any useful contribution UNIFIL could make after 19 October.

16. The situation within the UNIFIL area of operations in southern Lebanon has certainly not changed dramatically since we last discussed the subject in the Council. In his latest report on UNIFIL, the Secretary-General has made the observation that "the activities of UNIFIL have remained essentially unchanged" [*S/16036, para. 18*]. We all know that the Israeli invasion of June 1982 radically changed the conditions under which UNIFIL was created and is intended to function. Since that invasion, it has become practically impossible for UNIFIL to carry out the mandate given to it by the Council in resolution 425 (1978). Moreover, the capability of UNIFIL to carry out its interim tasks after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon is necessarily contingent upon the co-operation of the Israeli authorities, who, as the occupying Power, are in control of the area. We are happy to note from the report of the Secretary-General that UNIFIL has been fairly successful in carrying out those interim tasks in providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population and in trying to prevent activities which could endanger the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government in the area.

17. We also note that, although the Israel Defence Forces continued to recruit and arm selected villagers in the UNIFIL area, incidents with those armed irregulars have occurred less frequently and have tended to be less serious than before. We repeat our call on the Government of Israel to respect UNIFIL's mandate.

18. The situation in southern Lebanon has not changed to the extent that the original peace-keeping functions of UNIFIL may be restored within the foreseeable future. However, we realize at the same time that a decision on our part to withdraw from UNIFIL completely could have an adverse effect on efforts of the United Nations to contribute to a solution of the crisis in Lebanon. We fully support the endeavours of the Secretary-General to that end, and I should like to repeat what the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Mr. Hans van den Broek, has recently said in the General Assembly: "the Netherlands interest in United Nations peace-keeping remains undiminished".[1]

19. Moreover, we still hope that the Council, acting in agreement with the Government of Lebanon, may devise a more meaningful role for UNIFIL than the Force is able to fulfil nowadays.

20. It is with those considerations in mind that the Netherlands Government, after close consultation with the Secretary-General, the Government of Lebanon and our friends in UNIFIL, has decided not to withdraw from UNIFIL altogether but to retain a limited contingent with the Force.

21. The international community would be neglecting its commitment to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, as expressed in so many resolutions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, if it failed to make appropriate use of the potential of United Nations peace-keeping operations to restore international peace and security in the area. We agree with the Secretary-General that UNIFIL, despite the present circumstances, still remains an important expression of this commitment of the United Nations to assist the Government of Lebanon in achieving the resto-

ration of its effective authority in southern Lebanon. At the same time, however, we must recognize that the international community cannot be expected to continue to support Lebanon indefinitely.

22. It is essential that all foreign forces whose presence is not desired by the central Government should withdraw from Lebanon. My Government wishes therefore once again to impress upon all parties the need to co-operate seriously toward that end.

23. Finally, I should like to express my Government's concern about the increasing financial difficulties faced by UNIFIL. The Secretary-General has informed us that, as of the beginning of October 1983, there is an accumulated shortfall in UNIFIL's special account of some $173.9 million. It is most regrettable that some Member States, while professing support for maintaining peace and security, are consistently failing to honour their obligations. Consequently, they are placing an additional financial burden on the troop-contributing countries, some of which are developing countries that badly need their financial resources. This attitude might, in the future, place in jeopardy the functioning of peace-keeping operations, as well as hinder efforts to ensure wide geographical representation in the peace-keeping forces.

24. We therefore hope that the most urgent appeal of the Secretary-General to all Member States to pay their assessments without delay will be promptly heeded.

25. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his kind words about me.

26. Mr. de la BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) (*interpretation from French*): I should like to say first, Sir, how pleased my country is to see your country assuming the presidency—and particularly how pleased we are to see you presiding over our work. We recall that you represented your country in our capital in a particularly outstanding way, and that you gained many friends there, as you have done in all the other posts you have held. We are sure that your intelligence, your wisdom, your vast experience and your professional qualifications guarantee the success of your term in office as President. May I add that your personal courtesy, your kindness and your sense of humour—which, I would say, is another expression of your kindness and your curiosity about others—are also guarantees that you will have not only a very fruitful presidency but also one that will be very pleasant for all of us.

27. The Council has just renewed for a six-month period the mandate of UNIFIL. By associating itself with the decision just taken, my delegation wished to show the importance it attaches to UNIFIL's role in southern Lebanon. France, in fact, shares the assessment made by the Secretary-General in his report that "It is evident that, despite the present circumstances, UNIFIL remains an important element of stability in southern Lebanon" [*ibid., para. 21*]. UNIFIL's presence also expresses the resolve of the United Nations to support Lebanon's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

28. It should be pointed out, however, that the objectives set for the Force by the Council in its resolution 425 (1978) have not always been attained. The Israeli invasion of June 1982 radically changed the conditions in which UNIFIL must operate. Not only has Israel not withdrawn from southern Lebanon but an operational battalion of its soldiers is present in the zone that is in principle controlled by UNIFIL.

29. It is to be hoped that this will be only a temporary situation and that there, as everywhere else in Lebanon, the unity, integrity and independence of the country will be restored. We think that, in the same spirit, the Council will be called upon to give UNIFIL, in addition to the missions that it is already carrying out, new tasks in new areas. A useful instrument, very well adapted and well organized, the Force has demonstrated its usefulness in the field by restoring security to the countryside. Similarly, it seems to us that observers with the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, who are fully qualified for the tasks they undertake in particularly difficult conditions and who have acquired a reputation of impartiality and objectivity, could certainly be invited to carry out other missions in other areas.

30. I listened most attentively to the statement made by Mr. Turk, the Secretary-General of Lebanon's Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I should like to tell him on this occasion that France stands by his country's legal Government, to which it will continue to give its support.

31. In conclusion on this subject, I wish to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for his persevering work in respect of UNIFIL. I express to him the complete confidence of my authorities in the delicate and difficult task that he has embarked upon, and I assure him of our support.

32. Finally, I should like to say how much we appreciated the remarkable, brilliant and intelligent way in which the Council was presided over last month by our colleague from Guyana, with whose courtesy, kindness, intelligence and skill we are all familiar; this made it possible for him to bring out the best in everyone. We thank him most warmly for this.

33. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of France for the kind and warm words and particularly for the praise that he addressed to me.

34. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Today, the Council is having to deal yet again—for the fourteenth time—with the question of the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL. This fact is in itself eloquent testimony to the continuing explosive situation in that country.

35. In order to understand the true essence of the events occurring in Lebanon, we have to place them in their proper perspective. To this very day, the consequences of the large-scale aggression committed against Lebanon by Israel in the summer of 1982, with the support and patron-

age of the United States, still remain unresolved. Incidentally, no one has any right to forget that in committing this aggression Israeli troops grossly violated the Charter of the United Nations and high-handedly and, I would say, unprecedentedly, trampled underfoot the United Nations flag by passing through regions where UNIFIL contingents had been posted.

36. To this day the Israeli occupiers remain in possession of a considerable portion of Lebanese territory. Israel's recent so-called redeployment of its forces is aimed essentially at the long-term entrenchment of the aggressor along new lines, and at the perpetuation of Israeli occupation of areas of southern Lebanon. In other words, it is aimed, in the final analysis, at the annexation of those areas. We are reminded of Israel's true designs by the following fact: the lines along which Israeli troops are at present deployed in Lebanon are almost identical to the lines which as far back as 1919 were declared by the Zionists to be the northern frontier of Israel.

37. Washington and Tel Aviv forced Lebanon at gunpoint to agree to a capitulationist agreement with Israel, which infringes upon the sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese State and poses a threat to the security of neighbouring Arab countries.

38. Along with Israel, the so-called multinational force is consolidating its position on Lebanese soil. The backbone of that force is the American contingent of marines. On the pretext of ensuring the defence of this interventionist corps, a whole armada of naval vessels of the United States and its allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is lying off the Lebanese coast.

39. It should be recalled that a year ago, when the first contingent of marines was sent to Lebanon, it was declared that those troops were intended only to ensure the security of the Palestinian and Lebanese populations. It was further asserted at that time that the "multinational force" was to be in Beirut for no longer than a month. It was stated that in no circumstances would it engage in combat. Now strenuous attempts are being made to forget those assurances. It would appear that, like certain Council resolutions on Lebanon, these have been consigned to the "redundant" file.

40. Now the logic of imperialist intervention has borne its inevitable fruit. The "multinational force" which went to Lebanon allegedly to defend the local civilian population, has now engaged there in actual combat, using aircraft and naval artillery. The Western press has reported the deaths of marines, but for some reason or other has remained silent about the number of civilians who have been killed by foreign bombs and shells.

41. I would remind members that a year ago, when deployment of the "multinational force" on Lebanese soil had just begun, the Soviet Union issued a strong warning about the possible dangerous consequences of that step. At that time there were those who were inclined to consider that those apprehensions were excessive, but time has only confirmed our worst forebodings.

42. I believe that it should be pointed out, too, that the Soviet Union was by no means alone in its expressions of profound concern about the despatch of the "multinational force" to Lebanon. In this regard, I refer in particular to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization of 1982, in which he quite rightly pointed out that the trend towards the creation of such forces is an alarming one.

43. The Soviet Union is firmly in favour of a unified Lebanon and of the restoration of Lebanon's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity. It is imperative that Israel should withdraw unconditionally from Lebanon. Neither American troops nor any of the foreign troops that accompanied them should remain on Lebanese soil. A settlement of the situation in that country should be achieved not through separate deals or arm-twisting, but on the basis of strict, unswerving compliance with the decisions of the United Nations, first and foremost Council resolutions 508 (1982) and 509 (1982), which no one has rescinded. Only in that way can we ensure a proper solution to the Lebanese problems.

44. As to UNIFIL, the Secretary-General's report points out that in the difficult circumstances of Israeli occupation the Force remains an important element of stability in its area of operations.

45. Therefore, taking into account the request of the Lebanese Government and the recommendation contained in the report of the Secretary-General, and bearing in mind that the purposes and tasks of UNIFIL will continue to be defined by its mandate as laid down in resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions of the Council on this subject, the Soviet delegation found it possible not to object to the extension of the mandate of the Force.

46. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for the kind words he addressed to me.

47. Mr. MARGETSON (United Kingdom): May I join in the congratulations, Sir, on your assumption of the office of President of the Council and in the appreciation of the personal qualities which you bring to that task.

48. May I also join in the expressions of gratitude to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for the excellence of his presidency of the Council last month.

49. My Government has supported the extension of the mandate of UNIFIL for a further six months. We did so in the light of the Secretary-General's recommendation favouring an extension. We have noted his view that the Force remains an important element of stability in southern Lebanon and that it represents a commitment by the United Nations to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon itself.

50. We extend again our tribute to the officers and men of UNIFIL and our appreciation to their Governments.

51. At the time of the last renewal of UNIFIL's mandate, in July [*2459th meeting*], I said that we should perhaps be asking ourselves whether there is anything the Council can do, beyond renewing the mandate to help the Lebanese Government regain that independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity for which we continually reiterate our support. We are still no nearer a response to that question. It cannot be right simply to continue extending the UNIFIL mandate without giving thought to how it can be updated to reflect the different circumstances with which we are now faced.

52. It is saddening that the Secretary-General, in his report, should yet again have called the Council's attention to the increasing financial difficulties faced by UNIFIL. The accumulated shortfall in the UNIFIL Special Account has increased since July by a further $5.5 million, to $173.9 million. The Secretary-General rightly expresses his extreme concern about this state of affairs, which he warns could jeopardize the functioning of the Force.

53. It is scandalous that some countries still refuse to pay their assessed contributions. They are throwing the burden onto the troop-contributing countries, several of which are developing countries which can ill afford it. They are also rapidly increasing the overall deficit of the United Nations, already in excess of $300 million, a deficit which, in the end, has to be covered by all Member States.

54. I should like to associate myself with the remarks of the representative of the Netherlands on this subject, and I trust that the withholding States will reconsider their policy and pay their fair share of the costs of UNIFIL instead of expecting other, often poorer, States to bear it for them.

55. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words he addressed to me.

56. I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Israel in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In keeping with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blum (Israel) took a place at the Council table.

57. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I call on the representative of Israel.

58. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Permit me at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. You and I represent in the United Nations the two States that emerged on the territory of the former Palestine Mandate—one Arab and one Jewish. For reasons well known to all of us, we have not been able thus far to enjoy the blessings of peace in our bilateral relations. I know you will join me in expressing the hope that our two countries will soon establish peace, good-neighbourliness and friendship for their own benefit and for the benefit of the entire region.

59. May I also take this opportunity to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Sinclair of Guyana, for the very able manner in which he carried out his functions as President of the Council last month.

60. It was not my intention to take the floor here today. However, in view of the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, replete as it was with the customary Soviet distortions regarding the situation in Lebanon, I feel constrained to state anew my country's position. In so doing, I wish to express our appreciation to the representative of the Soviet Union for his renewed assertion of his country's respect for the Charter of the United Nations—which respect is so vividly demonstrated throughout the length and breadth of Afghanistan.

61. I should also like to refresh the memory of the members of the Council. It was the Soviet Union that opposed the establishment of UNIFIL in the first place and never gave its support to the establishment of the Force and, subsequently, to the extension of its mandate. In keeping with that position, the Soviet Union has not contributed even one penny to the maintenance of the Force, and it is, to say the least, exceedingly moving to listen to the concern displayed by the representative of the Soviet Union for the well-being and the functions of the Force.

62. Under the circumstances, I should like—as I have indicated before—to state anew my country's position with regard to the situation in Lebanon in general and concerning UNIFIL's mandate in particular.

63. The resolution adopted by the Council today does not change in any manner UNIFIL's existing mandate, subject, of course, to the observation made by the Secretary-General in paragraph 21 of his report, in which he rightly stated that recent events in Lebanon had "radically altered the conditions under which UNIFIL was created and is intended to function".

64. Over the past year the Government of Israel has repeatedly stated that in the new circumstances surrounding the situation in Lebanon UNIFIL as established in 1978 has outlived its usefulness and its presence is no longer called for in southern Lebanon.

65. The continuing tragedy of Lebanon is a consequence of the havoc wreaked by the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and its allies over the past decade. Knowing full well the potential for subversion inherent in the PLO, Arab Governments were unwilling to tolerate the presence of this terrorist organization on their own countries' soil and, as a result, dumped that group upon Beirut and on the people of Lebanon. As a consequence, Lebanon's sovereignty was eroded and the country was torn apart by violent strife. This, in turn, was seized upon by Syria as a pretext for invading Lebanon in an attempt to realize its

long-standing ambition to destroy Lebanese sovereignty and to incorporate Lebanon as an integral part of what the Syrians have for a very long time referred to as greater Syria.

66. It is well known that Israel stands for the full restoration of Lebanese sovereignty, of Lebanese independence, of Lebanese territorial integrity and of the unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, as well as for the restoration of the authority of the lawful Government of Lebanon within the country.

67. Israel believes that, in order to permit the attainment of that goal, all foreign forces must be withdrawn from the country.

68. Alongside these objectives, and bearing in mind the experience of recent years, Israel's legitimate security needs must also be guaranteed and Lebanese territory must never be used again for attacks upon our citizens.

69. The Agreement concluded by Israel and Lebanon on 17 May 1983 is linked to these requirements. Israel was and remains determined to proceed towards full and speedy implementation of this Agreement aimed at the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. However, it must have become clear to everyone by now that Syria and the PLO have no more intention of respecting Lebanese sovereignty today than they did in the past. We have all heard Lebanon's emphatic and repeated demands for the withdrawal of the Syrian forces and the PLO from its territory. Last year Lebanese President Amin Gemayel used the rostrum of the General Assembly to call for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon".[2]

70. In a letter to the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, held at Fez in November 1981 and September 1982, Lebanon explicitly demanded the termination of the Syrian and PLO presence in that country. Lebanon reiterated its demands as recently as last month. On 2 September the Lebanese Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States [*S/15953, annex*] insisting again on Syrian and PLO withdrawal. He repeated this demand in his statement in the general debate of the General Assembly.

71. Yet all this has been to no avail. Not only has Syria paid no heed to these demands, but it has increased its involvement in Lebanon and is engaged in direct warfare against the legitimate Government of that country. President Hafez Al-Assad, backed diplomatically and militarily by the Soviet Union, and assisted by Palestinian terrorists, continues his ruthless operations to keep Lebanon in disarray in an attempt to force Lebanon to submit to Syrian domination. Resorting to its well known tactics of threats and extortion, Syria continues to undermine Lebanon's path to regaining its sovereignty. This is pursued by Syria directly or by proxy, and its uninhibited brutality stops short of nothing.

72. Israel's withdrawal from the Shouf mountains, a first step in the direction of total withdrawal, was announced well in advance in order to provide the Lebanese Government and army with a chance to extend its control over that area. They were prevented from doing so by Syria and its proxies, which turned Lebanon once again into a battleground, exploiting existing enmity between groups there and encouraging all-out war against its legitimate Government.

73. Israel welcomes the cease-fire declared in Lebanon a fortnight ago and expresses its hope that the cessation of hostilities will endure, leading to true reconciliation free of outside interventions and dictates. We are following the situation closely and are looking forward to the establishment of conditions which will ensure security and tranquillity along the Israel-Lebanese border. Under no circumstances will Israel agree to return to the state of affairs which prevailed until 16 months ago, when Lebanese territory was used as a base for terrorist operations against our citizens. Israel sincerely hopes for and wishes to see an independent Lebanon in which a strong and stable régime exercises control throughout the country.

74. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Council has heard the statement by the representative of Israel. I should like to point out the ill will and hypocrisy evident in that statement, especially as regards his country's alleged love of peace. I think it my duty as representative of Jordan to remind the Council that Israel, which arrogantly speaks of peace, has occupied Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights for more than 16 years, in addition to its occupation of southern Lebanon, its refusal to be inclined towards peace ever since it was established, its dependence on military expansion and its attempt to impose its domination and hegemony over the region at the expense of its indigenous peoples.

75. I now request the representative of Israel to resume his place at the side of the Council chamber.

76. I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic) took a place at the Council table.

77. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I call on the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic.

78. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic) (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like, Sir, to thank you and the members of the Council for allowing me to make my statement. On this occasion, I should like to congratulate you, the Arab President of the Security Council. Our relations, which are of long standing in the Council, have always been constructive, and through them we have always been able to arrive at important resolutions. I would mention in particular resolution 509 (1982), in

which the Council demands total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories.

79. I should like at the outset to thank Mr. Sinclair of Guyana for the excellent manner in which he steered the work of the Council and to express appreciation of his wisdom and understanding in dealing with the problems and issues that were before the Council during his presidency last month.

80. It was not my delegation's intention to intervene in this discussion. However, the representative of zionism has come here to disturb the atmosphere during these deliberations of the Council, and that has obliged me to speak.

81. How could the representative of Israel be invited to make a statement to the Council? This is an organ of the United Nations. I wish to remind the Council of one thing, namely, the crimes committed by Israel against the United Nations. In view of the lateness of the hour I shall mention just one—the crime committed by Israel's present Prime Minister, Shamir, who personally implemented the physical liquidation of the United Nations mediator in Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte. The representative of Israel also represents his Prime Minister, Shamir, who is a criminal well known to everyone. That crime even motivated some authorities in Sweden to demand that Shamir be tried as a war criminal. How can the representative of such a person attack Syria and its noble objectives in Lebanon, its sacrifices on Lebanese territory, made in the interests of Lebanon, when his Prime Minister committed a crime that is punishable even by Israel's laws themselves?

82. Israel claims that zionism is a liberation movement—a liberation movement that destroyed Palestine from end to end, and led to the occupation of the Golan Heights and the larger part of Lebanon. How can Israel call that a liberation movement, when the real liberation movements are bombarded and attacked in their camps, with no regard for the civilian population made up of old men, women and children, who are attacked and have crimes committed against them under the protection of the Israeli authorities? I remind the Council of the crimes committed by Israel after that of Deir Yassin—namely, the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, near Beirut.

83. I believe if the Council wishes to carry out its duties towards the people of Lebanon, it must without delay fulfil its commitments under the whole of resolution 509 (1982) and put an end to any attempt to distort that resolution. There are serious attempts through the current manoeuvres—and we have just heard the representative of zionism here—to put the Syrian forces, which are part of the Arab peace-keeping forces, on the same level as the Israeli invading forces. These attempts are rejected by Lebanon, Syria and the other Arabs, and they have already been rejected by the majority of members of the Council.

84. Israel's ambitions in Lebanon are well known to all. At the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, when the zionist delegation distributed a map of the so-called territory of Israel, the map included the southern part of Lebanon and Syria, and the eastern bank of Jordan, parallel to the Hajazi railway line from Damascus to Medina. Moreover, the memoirs of Sharett, a former Foreign Minister of Israel, revealed that since 1954 Israel was seeking a leader in Lebanon to be its agent in a preliminary attempt to create sectarian disputes in Lebanon so that Israel could achieve the division of Lebanon into sectarian States. Israel was able to secure Major Haddad, who now, with the Israeli occupation forces, controls southern Lebanon. The savage and barbaric war launched by Israel in Lebanon in June 1982 and the criminal actions against the Lebanese people in their cities, towns and villages, and against social, economic, educational and health institutions, as well as the water projects, were but a step to pave the way for the annexation of the region. It has been revealed that Israel has incorporated this territory within its economic sphere and exploits, that it is competing with the people of the region by flooding them with Israeli products, and that it diverts land, sea and air transport to Israel.

85. Because of the lateness of the hour, I shall not speak at length, but I should like to inform the Council of the statement made by the President of Syria to Swiss television a few days ago. Asked "Do you believe that Lebanon can attain peace if all foreign forces withdraw from it?", he replied:

> "In Lebanon there is one foreign army, the Israeli army, which is an invader. The Lebanese and Syrians are Arabs and one people. We have one language, one common history. It seems that this fact is not known to many in the Western world. Despite the fact that we are one people, we have not gone into Lebanon except at the request of the legitimate authority in Lebanon. A Syrian force was requested to put an end to the civil war. If the Lebanese Government had requested the withdrawal of Syrian forces prior to the Israeli invasion, the Syrian forces would have withdrawn at the time set by the Lebanese authorities. Moreover, we had at one time wished to withdraw from Lebanon, but the legitimate authorities there insisted that we stay on. If you refer to statements of the Presidents of Lebanon from 1976 until prior to the Israeli invasion, and even during it, you will find proof of what I have said (you will find proof in the statements of the two Presidents of Lebanon who were in power from 1976 until the Israeli invasion); and you will find praise for the Syrian forces and their role in putting an end to the civil war. The conflicting parties had to remove the seeds of the civil war.
>
> "Israel must withdraw from Lebanon. There is only one foreign army in Lebanon, and that is the Israeli army, which came in as an invader. Israel has its own language and systems, in no way linked to Lebanon or any other Arab country. The Israeli forces must withdraw from Lebanon without imposing any conditions on that country. The withdrawal of the Israeli forces will help to put an end to the Lebanese disputes, with the help of the Arabs.

"As far as the Syrian forces are concerned, the Syrian forces are prepared to withdraw at the request of the Lebanese Government after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces, because then it would be a request resulting from a decision by the Lebanese Government and not from Israeli pressure because of Israeli occupation in Lebanon."

86. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I thank the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic for the kind words he addressed to me. I request him to resume his place at the side of the Council chamber.

87. Requests have been made to be allowed to exercise the right of reply. However, in view of the lateness of the hour, I intend, with the consent of the Council, to adjourn at this time. The time of the next meeting will be decided upon after consultations with members.

The meeting rose at 1.55 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 10th meeting, para. 58.

[2] *Ibid., Thirty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 35th meeting, para. 10.

كيفية الحصول على منشورات الأمم المتحدة

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—January 1992—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

2481st MEETING: 20 OCTOBER 1983

NEW YORK

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2481st MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 20 October 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2481/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table; Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 19 October from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I have the honour, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to request an invitation to the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, headed by me, to participate in the Security Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia' which begins on 20 October. The other members of the Council's delegation to these forthcoming meetings of the Security Council are: Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. Khwaja Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. A. Coskun Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Feodor Starcević (Yugoslavia) and Ms. Myrna Bradshaw (Guyana)."

3. On previous occasions, the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I

have received a letter dated 18 October from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the Special Committee, I have the honour to request, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to be invited to participate in the Council's consideration of the situation in Namibia."

5. On previous occasions, the Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

It was so decided.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 October from the representative of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/16055*], which reads as follows:

> "We the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that, during its meetings devoted to consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia', the Security Council extend an invitation, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of the South West Africa People's Organization."

7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to extend an invitation to Mr. Mueshihange in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Security Council is meeting today in response to requests from the representative of Senegal in a letter dated 17 October [*S/16048*] and from the representative of India in a letter dated 18 October [*S/16051*] addressed to the President of the Council.

9. The members of the Council have before them document S/15943, which contains a further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia.

10. I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16050, containing a letter dated 17 October from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the text of a decision on the question of Namibia adopted by the Special Committee at its 1248th meeting on 13 October 1983.[1]

11. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Mr. Goshe Wolde, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as representative of the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I welcome Mr. Wolde and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

12. Mr. WOLDE (Ethiopia): It is with a deep sense of honour and pleasure that I make this statement to the Council as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the representative of the current Chairman of the OAU, on an issue to which Africa attaches great importance and with which Ethiopia in particular has a long-standing association.

13. Having said those few words, Sir, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and to extend to you my best wishes for the successful completion of your term of office. I should, in the same vein, like to express the appreciation of the Ethiopian delegation to the representative of Guyana for the highly admirable manner in which he guided the deliberations of the Council during the very busy month of September.

14. It is a matter of record that, ever since 1946, the question of Namibia, the subject of the Council's deliberations today, has been on the agenda of the General Assembly. Since then, all the major organs of the United Nations have, at one time or another, been seized of the question and countless resolutions have been adopted on it, so that today the independence of the Namibian people is increasingly becoming a litmus test for the effectiveness of the United Nations in general and that of the Security Council in particular.

15. As we all know, the General Assembly has during successive sessions pronounced itself on the developments in Namibia, and in 1966 it terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory [*resolution 2145 (XXI)*], setting up the following year a United Nations body to administer the Territory until independence.

16. The International Court of Justice too has on several occasions considered the question, and in 1971 it handed down an important advisory opinion whereby it ruled the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal.[2] In this connection, we in Ethiopia feel particular pride at having been associated with efforts at the Court towards upholding the legal authority of the United Nations over Namibia.

17. As the statutory guardian of international peace and security, the Council has also been convened frequently to consider the question of Namibia and even met once on African soil, in our capital city, Addis Ababa. It has, moreover, adopted numerous decisions, among which resolutions 264 (1969), 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) figure

prominently. Yet Namibia remains under South Africa's illegal occupation.

18. However, when in 1978 the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), there was a widely shared sense of optimism that at long last the day for Namibia's independence was fast approaching. There were, of course, a few of us who were sceptical, doubting both the sincerity of the South African régime and the determination of the members of the so-called Western contact group. As subsequent developments have shown, the sceptics have been proven right. The best efforts of the Secretary-General, the flexibility and statesmanship of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the sole and legitimate representative of the struggling people of Namibia, and the co-operation of the front-line States notwithstanding, it has been impossible to put into operation the United Nations plan as embodied in resolution 435 (1978).

19. We all know the reasons why. Clearly, they are the intransigence and prevarication of the South African régime and the total lack of political will and determination on the part of the Western contact group. Indeed, South Africa not only has effectively blocked the implementation of the United Nations plan but has also used the negotiating process to strengthen its grip over Namibia by establishing illegal institutions and organizing puppet political groups.

20. When South Africa declared during the pre-implementation talks in Geneva that it was not ready to implement the United Nations plan, we believed that the imposition of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations was the most logical course of action. To our deep regret, however, that peaceful course was blocked by the triple veto cast by the three permanent members of the Council who were also members of the contact group.

21. Today that peaceful course is still not only blocked, but with the advent of a new Administration in Washington, the question of Namibia's independence has been rendered more difficult and complex by the infamous strategem of linkage. The question of Namibia is a question of the inalienable and undeniable right of a people to self-determination and independence and, as such, it is an issue of international concern. The presence of Cuban forces in Angola, on the other hand, is a matter falling entirely within the sovereign rights of Angola. To link these two is, I submit, both irrational and irresponsible. Given the fact that the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola is a strategic objective of one particular member of the contact group, we find the linkage self-serving as well.

22. From the latest report of the Secretary-General on the matter [*S/15943*], we gather that, as far as the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) is concerned, virtually all the outstanding issues have been resolved. What appears to block the implementation of the plan is therefore the irrelevant and unjustified precondition of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

23. At this juncture, I should like to review very briefly this contrived issue of the Cuban presence in Angola in its historical context and proper perspective. To begin with, we have to ask ourselves why the Cuban forces are in Angola. As we all recall, the presence of Cuban forces was requested by the legitimate Government of Angola, for the clear and express objective of repulsing the open and flagrant invasion by South Africa. Even though the first invasion was repulsed in time by the Angolan people, with the assistance of Cuban troops, we should not forget that South Africa's acts of aggression have continued since then, and that at present the armed forces of Pretoria are in illegal occupation of parts of southern Angola. Hence the continued need for the assistance of Cuban forces, which is in full conformity with Article 51 of the Charter, according to which every State has the right to individual or collective self-defence.

24. The presence of Cuban forces in Angola, therefore, is not only legitimate and legal; it is also a positive element in the continuing struggle for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. As regards the other States in the region, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola has neither harmed nor threatened their security and stability. Moreover, it has not posed—and indeed cannot pose—a threat to South Africa, a country whose war machine is by far superior to the armed forces of the States in the entire subregion. Furthermore, for the Cuban forces to pose a direct threat to Pretoria, Angola and South Africa must at least share a common border, which they obviously do not.

25. To talk of South Africa's security concern over troops in a country with which it has no common border can as a result only be construed as an acceptance, however tacit, of the occupation by South Africa of the international Territory of Namibia as legal. And to raise this as an international issue, much less link it with the question of Namibia's independence, cannot but also be an open and arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of Angola, in clear contravention of the principles and norms of international law.

26. Our bitter experience with the South African régime and our frustration at the failure of the contact group to assist in the implementation of the plan compel us to wonder—and wonder aloud—whether the question of linkage is not merely one more of the many obstacles that are continually being created to delay the implementation of the United Nations plan. Indeed, we in Ethiopia are convinced that even with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the plan will remain a dead letter. We are further convinced that what the strategem of linkage is intended to achieve, and what would probably happen following the withdrawal of Cuban forces, is the invasion and occupation of Angola with the dual aim of overthrowing its legitimate Government and replacing it by traitorous elements subservient to neo-colonial and racist interests and of weakening the liberation struggle of the Namibian people.

27. Fortunately, the international community has clearly perceived this clever but transparent ploy and has, as a

result, taken a clear and unequivocal stand against the attempts to link Namibia's independence with any extraneous and irrelevant issues. In this connection, it is to be recalled that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, at its nineteenth ordinary session at Addis Ababa in June 1983, took an unequivocal position which is set out in paragraph 2 of its special resolution on Namibia.[1] In that resolution, the Assembly, viewing with the utmost concern the attempt to introduce extraneous elements to the United Nations plan for Namibia as contained in resolution 435 (1978), categorically rejected the so-called linkage or parallelism and viewed the insistence on these extraneous elements as undermining the current efforts towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) by holding the freedom and independence of the people of Namibia hostage to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The Assembly also considered such an insistence as flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, the People's Republic of Angola.

28. At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, the Heads of State or Government "categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the United States Administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola." [*S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 48.*]

29. The International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983, as well as numerous subsidiary organs of the General Assembly—particularly the United Nations Council for Namibia—and, above all, the General Assembly itself, have all rejected this linkage. Indeed, at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly in paragraph 3 of its resolution 37/233 B firmly rejected the persistent attempts by the United States of America and South Africa to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and any extraneous issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and emphasized unequivocally that the persistence of such attempts would only retard the decolonization process in Namibia as well as constitute interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

30. These and other formal pronouncements by individual Governments and international organizations clearly show the emergence of an international consensus rejecting the so-called linkage or parallelism with regard to Namibia's independence. Regrettably, however, an important organ of the United Nations—more particularly the Security Council—has yet to pronounce itself on the matter. To remain silent much longer is but to acquiesce in the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. It is also a denial of the central role and unique responsibility of the United Nations in the decolonization of Namibia.

31. By taking an uequivocal stand in rejecting linkage, the Council can surely help remove the artificial obstacle to the implementation of the plan and advance the process of the liberation of Namibia. By so doing, the Council can, furthermore, reassert its responsibility in the matter and enhance its relevance to the maintenance of international peace and security, to which South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia poses a challenge. We therefore strongly urge the Council to reject all attempts to link Namibia's independence with any extraneous and irrelevant issue, such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

32. We also urge the Council to establish a time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The just cause of the Namibian people and international legality demand that the implementation of the plan no longer be delayed. If, however, South Africa persists in its dilatory tactics, the Council should seriously consider measures against that régime under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We have said time and time again that those who fail to heed the law should be brought to suffer its sanction. And so it should be with South Africa.

33. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of India, who wishes to make a statement on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

34. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for the courtesy extended to me to address the Council as representative of India and also on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

35. I should also like to begin my statement with the traditional expression of felicitations to you, Sir. We are happy to see a diplomat of your experience and accomplishments presiding over the deliberations of this august body. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to my delegation to find the stewardship of the Council in the able hands of the representative of a friendly and fellow non-aligned country, particularly at a time when the Council is again seized of an issue of very special concern to the Non-Aligned Movement.

36. We meet in this chamber for the second time this year to address ourselves to the question of Namibia. We last met here almost five months ago to deliberate upon this vexed question, which has thus far defied resolution and which continues to pose one of the biggest challenges to the very principles of the United Nations. In these five intervening months, we cannot claim to have come any nearer to an internationally acceptable solution. Meanwhile, the oppressed people of Namibia continue to languish in bondage, looking to the world, and to the United Nations in particular, for deliverance from their ordeal.

37. If there is one lesson we have learned from the bitter experience of the last few years, it is not to harbour optimism or expectation when dealing with the intransigent régime at Pretoria. Be that as it may, one would have hoped that the unanimous adoption by the Council of resolution 532 (1983) on 31 May 1983, following closely on the heels of a debate marked by remarkable restraint and lack of rancour, might signal a turning-point in the efforts

to implement the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. Some were indeed led to believe that this unanimous expression of support from the Council, apart from mandating the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, would set in motion more intensive and resolute efforts by those in a better position to make Pretoria see reason. The situation that currently obtains seems to point to the contrary and yet once again our hopes have been belied.

38. The report of the Secretary-General [*S/15943*] only emphasizes the irony of the present situation. On the one hand, as the Secretary-General informed us, the prolonged and intensive consultations relating to the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) have now brought us to a situation where, to use the Secretary-General's own words, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." At the same time, we are informed that, however, "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., paras. 24 and 25.*]

39. How ironic it is that the stage should be set in every way for putting into effect the United Nations plan but that this should be thwarted by considerations which have no relation to, or bearing upon, that plan. And how paradoxical it is that some of those who had themselves played a leading role in the elaboration of the United Nations plan and had committed themselves to securing its implementation should now openly be siding with Pretoria in making its implementation contingent upon the fulfilment of irrelevant and extraneous conditions. My Government cannot accept the distortion of a decolonization problem into one of ideological or East-West confrontation. It would be a travesty of justice to link Namibian independence with unrelated issues like the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

40. In the course of his statement to the Council on 23 May 1983 [*2437th meeting*], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, speaking also on behalf of over 100 non-aligned countries, set forth in detail the position taken by the Non-Aligned Movement in respect of the Namibian question. It is a well-known position and I need not repeat it here. Nor do I need to dwell on the position of my own country, which was among the first to raise the question at the United Nations, in 1946. Only a few weeks ago, in her address to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, described the question of Namibia as one which arouses our common indignation. She reaffirmed

> "our total support for the freedom struggle of the people of Namibia, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization, and to the Governments and peoples of the front-line States, which have to endure pressure and provocation."[4]

41. I should also like to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, held from 4 to 7 October 1983, devoted considerable attention to the question of Namibia and pronounced itself in unequivocal terms in this regard. In its final communiqué, the Meeting, *inter alia*, expressed its "strong indignation at the continued non-implementation of the United Nations plan" and categorically rejected

> "persistent attempts by the United States and racist South Africa to obstruct the implementation of the United Nations plan by insisting on 'linkage' and 'parallelism' between the independence of Namibia and extraneous and irrelevant issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and unequivocally emphasized that such attempts not only retard the decolonization process for Namibia, but also constitute a reprehensible and gross interference in the internal affairs of Angola." [*S/16035, para. 27.*]

42. At that Meeting, the non-aligned countries also

> "expressed their firm determination to counter all attempts to undermine the central role of the United Nations Security Council in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and urged the Security Council to assume fully its responsibilities, including taking urgent action to implement its decisions, if necessary by the adoption of enforcement measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter." [*Ibid., para. 29.*]

43. Speaking in the Council last May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India stated the following:

> "My delegation is convinced that the Council must now stipulate a definite time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and remain actively seized of the question until that process is completed. If South Africa continues to defy the Council's decisions, the Council should be prepared to consider appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter." [*2439th meeting, para 23.*]

44. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate that conviction. The time has surely come to force the pace. If South Africa continues to turn a deaf ear to the voice of reason, the United Nations has the moral and legal right, and indeed the obligation, to make it heed the will of the world community. We hope that all the members of the Council will appreciate the limits to forbearance and display the necessary political will to implement the Council's own decision without further delay.

45. Let us not convey to the Namibian people the impression that we have taken them or their patience for granted. Let us also not lose sight or make light of the situation in southern Africa, where a renegade and racist régime continues to be permitted to spread its reign of terror—in Namibia, in the independent African States of the region

and, last but not least, in South Africa itself. The voice of freedom can never be stilled. If we cannot bring freedom, justice and dignity to the people of Namibia and South Africa without further delay, events will surely take their own uncontrolled and bloody course in southern Africa, with disastrous consequences for international peace and security. It is time, therefore, for the Council to act, and act decisively, so that it can vindicate the trust reposed in it and so that Namibians can awaken to the freedom that is their right.

46. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Senegal, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of African States. I call on him now.

47. Mr. SARRÉ (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Mr. President, I wish on behalf of the African Group and on my own behalf to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. I am certain that, thanks to your wide diplomatic experience in international affairs, the Council's debates will be crowned with success.

48. I wish also to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair, the representative of Guyana, who effectively and ably guided the work of the Council last month.

49. Finally, I should like most sincerely to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for your kindness in inviting me to address the Council, in my capacity as Chairman of the African Group, during this debate on the question of Namibia, a question which is of great concern both to Africa, which is directly involved, and to the entire international community.

50. The details of the question of Namibia are familiar to everyone, and I shall not dwell on them. For nearly 38 years, indeed, this question has been a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly. It has already been dealt with in several special sessions, international conferences, seminars, round-tables discussions and interminable negotiations. The Council, the guarantor of international peace and security, has devoted several series of meetings to it.

51. There is no need, therefore, to go into the historical background of a problem which is still topical. It would, however, be of interest to recall, for the sake of clarity in the debate, a number of key events, which will help to make it easier to grasp the purport of the case of Namibia.

52. Members will recall that, between 25 and 29 April 1983, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence was held in Paris, convened in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 37/233 C.

53. During that important Conference, over which my country, Senegal, had the signal honour of presiding, two documents that to our mind embody a crucial stage in the struggle of the people of Namibia to regain their independence were adopted—namely, the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action for Namibia.[5]

54. Beyond the internationally recognized and accepted principles those two documents reaffirm in unequivocal terms, the Conference, as everyone knows, solemnly reiterated the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence in a united and free Namibia in accordance with the purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

55. On that occasion, the international community once again most energetically condemned the Pretoria régime for its illegal occupation of Namibia in violation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council calling upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibian territory and to promote, within the framework of the settlement plan set forth in resolution 435 (1978), the accession to independence of the people of Namibia.

56. As a result of the express recommendation of the Conference, the Council met in May 1983. At that meeting, in which several ministers of Africa and of the Non-Aligned Movement took part, the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983), by which *inter alia*, it decided to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to ensuring the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The resolution further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the results of those consultations not later than 31 August 1983.

57. At this stage I am pleased, on behalf of the Group of African States, to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for the diligent and responsible manner in which he carried out the mandate entrusted to him by the Council. His report [*S/15943*] reflects the lucidity and concern for clarity and objectivity that characterize him.

58. The following emerges from an analysis of the document: first, the Pretoria régime agrees to Council resolution 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as a basis for negotiations; secondly, the parties directly concerned, namely, South Africa and SWAPO, are solemnly committed to abiding by the arrangements agreed upon during stages one and two of the negotiations undertaken in 1982 in the context of resolution 435 (1978), without any change of any kind whatsoever; thirdly, that agreement in principle has been reached with regard, on the one hand, to the electoral system, concerning which it remains only to define the type and modalities, and, on the other hand, the composition and status of UNTAG.

59. In sum, all the aspects of a technical and operational nature, including the question of impartiality, leading to implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have been considered and largely agreed upon.

60. However—and this clearly emerges from the Secretary-General's report—South Africa persists in an unacceptable position that we reject: it seeks to link implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and hence the indepen-

dence of Namibia, to requirements that are the purview of the sovereignty of independent States of the region. Furthermore, the Pretoria régime makes this question a prerequisite for any settlement of the problem of Namibia.

61. There is no need to recall that this linkage has been condemned by the international community, during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in March last at New Delhi, and at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April. Better yet, in its special resolution on Namibia,[3] the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, at its nineteenth ordinary session at Addis Ababa in June, categorically rejected that linkage, which it regarded as a serious obstacle to the efforts undertaken to implement resolution 435 (1978).

62. Must we remind everyone that the question of Namibia essentially and fundamentally remains strictly a problem of decolonization that must, if possible, be settled peacefully in the spirit of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples? Must we recall that the question of Namibia is a problem that is still before the United Nations and that it is precisely in this framework that, in accordance with the wishes of the international community and of SWAPO itself, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, an appropriate solution must be found?

63. The message that the Group of African States has instructed me to transmit to the Council—and, indirectly, to the contact group—is in the spirit of justice and peace, for which the Council is responsible throughout the world.

64. Africa is patient but not resigned, and while there is still time, it again offers the hand of understanding rather than confrontation.

65. Africa, awaiting the outcome of the work of the Council, urges it, in accordance with the responsibilities conferred upon it by the United Nations, to consider the question of Namibia not only in the light of the initiatives recently taken by the Secretary-General but also in the light of the explosive situation prevailing in Namibia and southern Africa, and hence to exercise all its authority to implement resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), so that without further delay Namibia, which has suffered so much injustice of every kind, may finally fulfil the legitimate aspirations of its people and join the concert of free and independent nations.

66. Africa expects the Council to adopt appropriate measures to restore to the Namibians their human dignity and thereby enable them, because it is their right to do so, to drink, at last, at the spring of freedom regained.

67. Africa unanimously calls upon the Council to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter effectively and faithfully, in order to redress a flagrant injustice against a people whose only wrong is that it aspires to freedom. In so doing, without a doubt, the Council will spare the continent of Africa and the world at large the risk of a worsening armed conflict that could endanger international peace and security.

68. The Group of African States sincerely hopes that, from the Council's deliberations, will emerge specific measures to enable the Namibian people finally to be independent, the better to devote themselves to the tasks of economic and social development that await them. In so doing, it will have rekindled in us all the faith and credit we attach to the United Nations.

69. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I now call on Mr. Lusaka, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

70. Mr. LUSAKA: Sir, at the outset permit me to congratulate you, in my capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and on my own behalf, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We are confident that your eminent qualities as an experienced and skilled diplomat and your wide and varied experience in international affairs will stand us in good stead in our deliberations on the question of Namibia, a question of grave concern to the international community and for the maintenance of international peace and security. The strong support of your country, Jordan, and its people for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for national self-determination and independence is a matter of record and needs no elaboration.

71. I wish also to express our appreciation to the representative of Guyana, who during the month of September guided the deliberations of the Council with great skill and success.

72. The Council has been convened once again to consider the question of Namibia in the light of the Secretary-General's further report concerning the implementation of Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*ibid.*].

73. It will be recalled that, pursuant to the call made by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, and by the OAU, the Security Council met on the question of Namibia in May 1983 to consider further action to expedite the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978), endorsing the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence.

74. In the course of that debate, in which a large number of delegations were represented at the level of Minister for Foreign Affairs, unanimous expression was given to the need to implement resolution 435 (1978) without qualification, modification or prevarication. Indeed resolution 435 (1978) is the only internationally accepted basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.

75. It is essential to recall that, during the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia last May, we spoke in a measured and restrained voice, in the hope that racist

South Africa would perhaps be induced to listen. Unfortunately, its response to the Secretary-General's efforts indicates that it not only has misunderstood our moderation but has also attempted to exploit it.

76. As members of the Council are aware, the Secretary-General, in the exercise of the mandate entrusted to him by resolution 532 (1983) to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and to report to the Council on the results of those consultations as soon as possible and not later than 31 August 1983, initiated preliminary discussions with the parties to the proposed cease-fire with a view to reaching an agreement on the two remaining outstanding issues relating to the electoral system and the few remaining points pertaining to UNTAG and its composition.

77. It is important to stress here that, during the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Namibia last May, even South Africa's friends acknowledge that those two were the only remaining outstanding issues. Allow me to refer to statements made in that connection by two members of the Western contact group in the course of that debate.

78. At the 2439th meeting of the Council, on 23 May, the representative of the United Kingdom recorded his Government's agreement with the Secretary-General's statement that, as far as the United Nations was concerned, the only outstanding issues were the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition.

79. Addressing the Council on 25 May, the representative of the United States stated:

> "only two major issues remain to be resolved in preparation for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These are: the choice of the electoral system to be employed in the elections . . . and final technical matters concerning the composition of the military component of UNTAG." [*2443rd meeting, para. 186.*]

80. In his further report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General stated that, having been assured in the course of his preliminary discussions with South African officials of their Government's acceptance of resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as the basis for further discussion and its readiness to discuss the two remaining outstanding issues, he travelled to southern Africa and held talks with, among others, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the President of Angola, Mr. dos Santos, and the President of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma.

81. Assessing his efforts to carry out the mandate given to him by the Council in resolution 532 (1983), the Secretary-General observed in his report that his consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire had resulted, as far as UNTAG was concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues.

82. It should be recalled that the problems relating to the composition of UNTAG have been of South Africa's making. As the Secretary-General's report has made clear, the long-standing support of SWAPO for the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Security Council regarding the military composition of UNTAG was reiterated by the President of SWAPO during their discussions at Luanda last August.

83. As regards the electoral system, we know that SWAPO had for more than a year stressed its position that it was prepared, in principle, to accept either proportional representation or the single-member constituency system, a position which was reaffirmed by Mr. Nujoma during his discussion with the Secretary-General. Furthermore, Mr. Nujoma also urged the imperative need for a decision to be made on this matter as soon as possible and for the establishment of a time-frame for implementation [*ibid., para. 23*].

84. South Africa, on the other hand, has continued to be evasive. According to the Secretary-General's report, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to him that South Africa's choice of electoral system "would . . . be made by the Administrator-General and communicated to the Special Representative as soon as a date for implementation had been set" [*ibid., para. 14*]. South Africa's continued refusal to make known its preferred electoral system is yet another dilatory manoeuvre, contrary to the agreement reached by all the parties concerned in New York in July-August 1982 that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan.

85. After observing in his concluding remarks that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)", the Secretary-General stated that, however, "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) . . . makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*ibid., paras. 24 and 25.*] Not surprisingly, herein lies the characteristic dishonesty of the racist South African régime. True to form, it appeared to promise co-operation while intending defiance. Once again, racist South Africa unashamedly manoeuvred to exploit the good will and sincere intentions of those who had hoped that *apartheid* South Africa would, for once, show a human face.

86. It continues to be our firm position that the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) has absolutely nothing to do with the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The international community has rejected with a united voice the so-called linkage policy of South Africa. The Security Council must totally and unequivocally reject the so-called linkage policy of South Africa. The United Nations plan must, therefore, be implemented without further delay.

87. It would be unfair, indeed vulgar, to ask the people of Namibia, who continue to suffer under Pretoria's cruel colonial domination and savage repression, to show still more forbearance and still more patience. For how long are they to continue to bear this ordeal? Nothing that racist South Africa has done gives a modicum of hope. On the contrary, from year to year racist South Africa has devised new strategems to prevent the implementation of the United Nations plan and has flouted the will of the international community.

88. Some three years ago, at Geneva, Pretoria sabotaged the implementation of the United Nations plan by linking Namibia's independence to its spurious charge of United Nations lack of impartiality to oversee the implementation of the plan. Of late, South Africa has refined its stonewalling tactics by insolently linking the inalienable right of the Namibian people to national self-determination and genuine independence to unrelated, extraneous issues, such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. One wonders what Pretoria's next pretext will be. What will it link Namibia's independence to? Most likely it will link it to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), to a non-aggression pact or to the question of recognition of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). The list is endless. In the meantime, Namibia will continue to be held hostage. The Security Council should not, therefore, create a precedent by linking Namibia's independence to any irrelevant and extraneous issues, especially the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola.

89. Many world leaders have spoken during the current session of the General Assembly of the imperative need to restore the prestige and efficacy of the United Nations. They have warned that the lawlessness and immorality of a few pariah States like South Africa that bedevil the collective search for peace, justice, equality and freedom have ominous consequences. Many far-sighted and responsible personalities have forewarned of a catastrophic war not only engulfing the southern African region, but also spreading its flames well beyond its confines, unless the gross injustices and aggression visited upon the people of Namibia and the region by racist South Africa are brought to an immediate end.

90. Just a few days ago, on 17 October, South Africa once again perpetrated acts of aggression against the sovereign State of Mozambique, demonstrating its insatiable desire for adventurism, in complete disregard of international law. The United Nations Council for Namibia strongly condemns these callous acts of aggression, which threaten international peace and security.

91. If, as many complain, the United Nations has lost its effectiveness, its sense of justice and moral imperative, we have no one to blame but ourselves. It is inconceivable that, for nearly two decades now, *apartheid* South Africa, whose social and political standards are indistinguishable from nazism, has been allowed to make a mockery of our shared sense of justice. Let us not allow ourselves to share in *apartheid* South Africa's burdensome guilt. Let us resolve to have the political will to save the present as well as succeeding generations in southern Africa from the scourges of a catastrophic war. Let us resolve to reassert the authority, efficacy and moral superiority of the United Nations. And let us begin with Namibia, the saddest chapter of our shared history.

92. Let the Security Council, in a united and firm voice, send the message to racist South Africa that the international community will no longer tolerate its unending pretexts intended to prolong its illegal occupation of Namibia and to continue its unprovoked aggression against the neighbouring independent African States. Let the Council unequivocally set a time-frame for South Africa's pronouncement of its preferred electoral system so that the Council may adopt the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan. It should be made clear that should South Africa fail to make that pronouncement within that period of time, the Council—in the light of the serious threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa's continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia, its war of repression against the Namibian people, its persistent acts of aggression launched from bases in Namibia against independent African States and its repeated refusal to expedite the implementation of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia—would respond positively to the overwhelming demand of the international community by imposing against South Africa comprehensive mandatory sanctions, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

93. To do less is to fail to live up to our collective determination, under the Charter, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from international law can be maintained, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.

94. Let us act, and act now!

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at the beginning of this meeting. I now call on him to make his statement.

96. Mr. MUESHIHANGE: Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for giving our delegation the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia.

97. Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of October and to convey to one and all in the Council the warm greetings and best wishes of Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, who participated personally in the deliberations of the Council on the very same issue last May.

98. The oppressed people of Namibia and SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, are looking forward with

keen interest to a successful conclusion of the debate leading to the achievement of freedom and genuine independence of Namibia without further delay. We repose our trust and confidence in you, Sir, reassured by the fact that, under your able guidance and outstanding statesmanship, real and significant progress will be made.

99. I should like at this juncture to express fraternal greetings to and admiration for my brother, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for the outstanding leadership that he provided to the Council during the most trying month of September.

100. It gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO, to express our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to expedite the decolonization process of Namibia and for the close co-operation that we have enjoyed from him. I wish to reassure him that he can count on our continued support and readiness in the expeditious implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

101. Since the conclusion of the Council meetings last May, tension and hot-beds of conflict have continued to increase, thus further endangering the peace and security of the world.

102. Naturally, our primary preoccupation in this regard is southern Africa in general and Namibia in particular. Our region is smouldering under the heat waves of brutal racist repression, colonial domination, generalized State terrorism and various other acts of aggression and destabilization, a litany of heinous crimes for which the *apartheid* régime is solely responsible.

103. I wish to begin my intervention by giving a brief overview of the situation in southern Africa before I deal with the central issue of my statement, namely, the linkage pre-condition being insisted upon by the unholy alliance of *apartheid* South Africa and the current United States Administration.

104. Let me first of all say something about the recently concluded general debate in the General Assembly. It is important to note that this meeting is taking place following that debate in the Assembly. Many Heads of State or Government, ministers for foreign affairs and other high-ranking officials addressed the Assembly on the burning issues of the day. Undoubtedly, one such burning issue is Namibia.

105. It is with delight and appreciation that we recall that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations have reiterated their unswerving and active support for and solidarity with the embattled people of Namibia and SWAPO, whose military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), has been spearheading the militant national resistance of our people. We are particularly grateful to the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which SWAPO is a proud member, the socialist community of nations and other peace-loving and justice-upholding nations for the ongoing, principled and generous assistance to SWAPO and for reiterating collectively and severally their strong demand for liberation, justice and human dignity in favour of our people. Needless to say, this has not only reassured us of the fact that our friends and supporters remain committed in support of our cause but also that they are prepared to continue to render increased all-round assistance to us, which we need now more than ever before to intensify the struggle on all fronts, including in particular the armed struggle, as a matter of the birthright of an oppressed people to liberate its motherland.

106. In this context, I take exceptional pride and comfort in recalling the inspiring and brilliant address delivered in the General Assembly on 30 September by Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Chairman of the front-line States.

107. I can hardly pretend to have a better insight into the complexities of the critical situation in southern Africa than the Chairman of the front-line States. I should, therefore, like to cite a few relevant passages from his important address, which was received with resounding and prolonged applause.

108. At the very beginning of his address, Mr. Nyerere declared:

> "The danger that the freedom struggle in southern Africa will be confused by the East-West power conflict has become greater and more obvious. Namibia is still occupied by South Africa, and the tentative movements towards the isolation of *apartheid* South Africa from the world community which could be discerned during the 1970s are now apparently being reversed. Indeed, far from being forced to the defensive by world pressure, South Africa has been allowed to attack its neighbours with little reaction from the international community. It has received only verbal condemnation—if that—in response to its raids into Mozambique and Lesotho, its destabilization activities in those countries and also in Zimbabwe and Zambia and its innumerable aggressive actions against Angola, culminating in the occupation of part of Angolan territory.
>
> "South Africa's attempts to destabilize its neighbours are intensifying, yet South Africa is treated by many of us as if it were a respectable member of the world community which could be encouraged by constructive engagement into being a good neighbour. And when these countries look for world support, some Members of the United Nations advise that if they would only avoid provoking South Africa they would not suffer from the economic, social and political problems which the South African attacks create for them. The provocation referred to is their open and public opposition to *apartheid* and the reception of refugees from *apartheid* South Africa.
>
> "Unfortunately for South Africa's neighbours, the real provocation they offer is their very existence. The example, especially along its borders, of independent nations which proclaim the equality of man and are

trying to promote human dignity is a continual threat to the *apartheid* régime.

"The choice facing South Africa's neighbours is therefore very clear: either they become accomplices of this racist régime or they must prepare to defend themselves against its attacks. And the United Nations has either to support them in their defence or to become itself an accomplice of the racist State's attacks on its own people and its neighbours. In this context the United Nations means all our States, severally and jointly. Neutrality on racism is immoral and politically unsustainable in the long run"[6].

Concerning Namibia and the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), Mr. Nyerere had this to say:

"Negotiations about implementation have since then dragged on at a snail's pace. South Africa has been constantly stalling and manufacturing new objections to the plan, while the South West Africa People's Organization makes concession after concession in the search for peace.

". . . but South Africa refuses to begin its implementation because Angola has troops from Cuba helping it to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

"I must reiterate once more that Tanzania categorically rejects this attempt to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We know that South Africa has adopted this policy in the last two years on the encouragement of a permanent member of the Security Council. We know that South Africa is remaining stubborn with the encouragement of that State. Tanzania still says that Angola is an independent sovereign State which has suffered from external aggression from the moment of its birth. It has a right to decide for itself on its defence needs. The attempts to link the independence of Namibia with Angola's sovereign decisions has to be rejected by the whole of the United Nations."[7]

109. This eloquent analysis of the ever-deteriorating situation in southern Africa reflects the common concern of all the front-line States and, indeed, of Africa as a whole. In this connection, the special message of the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of the OAU, Mr. Mengistu Haile Mariam, Head of State of Ethiopia, which was read out to the Assembly on 11 October by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Goshe Wolde, unequivocally confirms Africa's collective position. It reads, in part:

"It is Africa's view that these acts of aggression and destabilization are designed not only to cripple the armed struggle of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa, but also to overthrow the Governments of the front-line States because of their steadfast and selfless support of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. I submit that this evil design should not be glossed over with more condemnatory and ineffective resolutions. Instead, the international community must assist the front-line States in every way possible in order to enable them to defend better their sovereignty and territorial integrity."[8]

110. Who can forget the concerted efforts being made by the illustrious Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi? In her capacity as the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, she made an important and thought-provoking statement at the 9th meeting of the General Assembly and also conducted extremely useful exchanges on the crucial issues of disarmament, development and liberation with other world leaders who, at her initiative, converged on New York during the month of September.

111. The consistent support being rendered to the national liberation movements by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement was further consolidated at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March this year, and we are most grateful to the ministers for foreign affairs of the non-aligned countries for once again reiterating their unswerving support for and active solidarity with the struggling peoples of South Africa and Namibia under the leadership of their movements, ANC and SWAPO respectively, as well as for renewing their principled position, which is further confirmation of the fact that the front-line States should be given all the necessary material and financial assistance to defend themselves against racist South Africa's persistent military attacks and other acts of aggression and destabilization.

112. I wish to state once again here that we are greatly indebted to the peoples and Governments of the front-line States, which have been more than generous over the years in their support of our struggle and are still, even today, in the face of untold suffering and the racist terror campaign being daily inflicted on them by the *apartheid* aggressor, prepared to stand firmly behind us, serving as a reliable rear base and a refuge for the Namibian refugees.

113. It is a painful but inescapable fact that the reactionary forces in *apartheid* South Africa and those abroad, who have always stubbornly resisted the forces of change and democracy, will intensify their notorious acts of military pressure, intervention, economic strangulation and sabotage in a sinister attempt to safeguard free access to raw materials and strategic minerals and to maintain geopolitical interests in southern Africa. That means to protect the *status quo*.

114. Certainly, in these circumstances, it is quite obvious that the liberation struggle will continue; the front-line States will use all the means at their disposal in the legitimate exercise of self-defence and they will be justified in inviting friendly countries to give them aid, and other external complications will follow. All this is likely to aggravate further the conflict and tension in southern Africa, threatening the whole region with ghastly consequences.

115. In his latest report, the Secretary-General aptly described this explosive situation as "both highly damaging to the peoples and Governments of the area and also a threat to the wider peace" [*ibid., para. 27*].

116. During the Council's debate in May on the situation in Namibia, the President of SWAPO, Comrade Sam Nujoma, made two substantive interventions dealing not only with the aspirations and expectations of our people for political emancipation, but also, and above all, with the delaying tactics and the intransigence of the Pretoria racist régime as well as the recalcitrance of certain major Western Powers whose policies continue to give encouragement and support to that régime. I therefore have no intention of recounting here the whole sordid history of our struggle.

117. I wish to devote the rest of my statement to the issue I raised earlier—namely, the linkage or parallelism which is today the primary source of unjustifiable catastrophe in the negotiations and the only obstacle to Namibia's full independence.

118. Our careful reading of the Secretary-General's report [*S/15943*], submitted to the Council pursuant to its resolution 532 (1983), has led us to the following conclusions: first, the Secretary-General has successfully carried out his mandate to undertake consultations with SWAPO and racist South Africa with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978); secondly, all the outstanding issues, which were in the first place mere deviations created by the racists and their collaborators as bargaining chips, have been resolved, so that everything strictly in terms of the United Nations plan is now in place; thirdly, those matters that are essentially technical in nature, such as the modalities of implementation, an enabling resolution to be adopted by the Council in order to launch the implementation process, dates for a cease-fire and for the emplacement of UNTAG, including related financial implications, and so forth, would be resolved rapidly within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) and on the basis of the understandings that were reached among the negotiating parties in August 1982 here in New York; fourthly, concerning South Africa's choice of electoral system to be used for elections to the Constituent Assembly—which must be either proportional representation or a single-member-constituency system—we took note of the Secretary-General's confirmation that Pretoria will communicate its choice prior to the Council's adoption of the enabling resolution; and, finally, SWAPO has once again reiterated its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the judicious implementation of the United Nations plan. There is a political will and determination to move forward on our part, and we challenge the Boer régime to do likewise.

119. In other words, as the Secretary-General himself concluded, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*ibid., para. 24.*]

120. Just to keep faith with our own convictions and to keep the record straight, however, I must state here that, in 1978, when the Council endorsed the United Nations plan in its resolution 435 (1978), all the necessary procedures and requirements for the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations had already been agreed upon after protracted and exhaustive negotiations. Both SWAPO and racist South Africa are on record as having accepted resolution 435 (1978).

121. The pertinent question now is why this particular meeting of the Council is not dealing with the formulation and adoption of an enabling resolution in a more congenial atmosphere, rather than being a forum of antagonism in a hostile atmosphere. Something is wrong here and, indeed, very much so. What is that something, and who are the wrongdoers?

122. What is wrong is the unilateral and unwarranted imposition of this outrageous issue of linkage by the United States on the Namibian negotiations. It is an open secret that it was the Reagan Administration which brought it up in 1981 and has since endeavoured to formalize it through official communications. We see it as part of the rescue operation Washington has launched within the framework of its so-called constructive-engagement policy, which is nothing but a pro-*apartheid* policy with demonstrable hostility towards the interests of millions of black people in the region. Racist South Africa is now conveniently using this outrageous United States policy to buy time while carrying out its diabolical schemes in Namibia and in South Africa itself.

123. This is a very serious development for us. It is also a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations, which has assumed a unique legal responsibility over Namibia until its independence. This callous display of arrogance of power to which we are being subjected by the United States, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, raises a serious question about the relevance of the Charter of the United Nations as well as about the relevant resolutions of the Council itself and those of the General Assembly with regard to our situation.

124. The record of racist South Africa's non-compliance with the demands of the international community, its defiant behaviour towards the authority of the United Nations and its intransigence and prevarication in the negotiations are well known. All of us have come to expect this from that pariah State of racist admirers of Hitler.

125. Ironically—and perhaps not so ironically—today it is the United States, which otherwise professes commitment to the ideals of fair play, peaceful resolution of conflicts, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and free elections, among others, that is obstructing Namibia's independence and holding to ransom our entire oppressed people struggling for the right to self-determination and freedom in their own motherland.

126. Most regrettably, Namibia's liberation has now been tied to extraneous and irrelevant issues over which we have absolutely no jurisdiction or control—issues, for that matter, with which we have no desire to be involved. Namibia is a clear and straightforward case of decolonization.

It is our people's birthright to be free and to rule themselves, with the co-operation and assistance of peace-loving and justice-upholding mankind.

127. It is quite obviously to us that if the unholy alliance of Washington and Pretoria is going to be allowed to get away with this despicable chicanery, Namibia's hopes for independence will once again have been dashed for many more years to come.

128. Our sources confirm that as far as the top Boer leadership is concerned, especially its military-intelligence-security establishment, the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is not contemplated for the next two to five years, if at all. It has been demonstrated by many experts that it is the South African military and military intelligence that call the shots, the racist Prime Minister himself being a hard-line warmonger and die-hard reactionary.

129. In the meantime the racists, whose military might and sophisticated weapons-technology are the talk of the town these days in the Western media, will continue to rely on reckless military adventurism and brutal repression inside Namibia and also on intensifying their various acts of aggression against the front-line States and ANC. True to type, the Pretoria racists launched yet another military attack against Mozambique just a few days before the convening of this meeting, in a manner that is supposed to give a warning to those who are committed to end *apartheid* and colonial tyranny. It is my sincere hope that the Council will, at an appropriate time and in a most effective way, add its unanimous voice to the public condemnation of this naked aggression, which underlines the dangerous siege mentality of the Afrikaaner racist minority.

130. Right now, the primary focus of the Pretoria racists is the implementation of the so-called internal constitutional reforms that are nothing but the old trick of "divide and rule" being orchestrated under a new but transparent guise of bogus power-sharing, with a view to divorcing the so-called Coloureds and the Asians from the ranks of the oppressed black population by offering them meaningless representation in a reconstituted Parliament that will always be dominated by the *apartheid* chieftains, further entrenching *apartheid* and excluding the great majority.

131. Therefore, Pretoria could afford, purely for tactical reasons, to create the impression, as part of its public relations offensive, of being flexible regarding the implementation of the United Nations plan. But the fact of the matter is that both Washington, which is now posturing for presidential elections next year, and Pretoria, whose calculations do not countenance a SWAPO victory in Namibia for a very long time to come, have their own hidden agendas, which are clearly at variance with our demands for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without any further delay.

132. In Angola, we see a replay of the 1975 nightmare by the racist troops, the Angolan bandits and traitors, mercenaries and other proponents of covert operations who readily provide cash and military aid to these nefarious forces whose aim is to destabilize Angola with the manifest aim of overthrowing the revolutionary Government of the MPLA-Workers Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido de Trabalho).

133. Much has been written since 1975 about Angola and the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and other clandestine activities by the enemies of the Angolan people, who, after waging a long and bitter struggle, freed themselves after more than 500 years of Portuguese brutal tyranny. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola, Mr. Paulo Jorge, in his brilliant recent statement at the 27th meeting of the General Assembly exposed the magnitude of the ongoing aggression in his country and offered facts and figures about the cost both in terms of human lives and in terms of property. The Angolan authorities have also prepared a "white paper" which gives more details about the critical situation there, and, thanks to the Permanent Mission of Angola to the United Nations, this document is being disseminated so that the truth may be known.

134. Angola needs practical solidarity, and that solidarity should not be in terms only of firing off exhortations, of repeated expressions of outrage, or of strong condemnations of the *apartheid* terrorists and their imperialist collaborators. What Angola needs above all, are material, financial and humanitarian resources in order more effectively to meet its pressing security, social welfare and economic priorities, which are daily being attacked by those hostile forces.

135. We are grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Council for having allowed me to participate in this crucial debate. I have come to plead the case of my people. If I at times sounded less than diplomatic or appeared to be emotionally charged, I assure you, Sir, it was not without cause. For us the situation in Namibia is most alarming: it involves the lives of our people—there are daily murders by the occupying colonial army and the racist trigger-happy police—and the very survival of our people. It is for these reasons that we strongly and unreservedly condemn the United States for holding the independence of Namibia hostage to absolutely alien considerations which Washington is pursuing all over the world for its own ideological and strategic interests.

136. Now is the time for the Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter against racist South Africa. It is our firm conviction that such historic action by the Council, which is the only remaining viable, realistic and peaceful means, will without doubt compel the Pretoria racist régime to co-operate fully in the speedy decolonization of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978).

137. What our people expect from the Council is a strong and unequivocal rejection of the linkage issue and a condemnation of the Washington-Pretoria unholy alliance that is responsible for it. We represent only a national liberation movement and a colonized people, whose yearning for freedom and daily suffering is the only justification for our struggle. But let there be no mistake about our courage to speak up loud and clear and look straight in the

eyes of those who would dominate us or weaken our resolve and to tell them exactly what is on our minds. For we know that no amount of force or arrogance of power can break the will of a determined people to free itself from foreign domination and colonial oppression. It is this conviction which assures us of the final victory of justice over might and it is this faith which inspires the combatants of PLAN to continue to heighten the pace of the armed struggle until every inch of the motherland is liberated.

138. In conclusion, I wish to register our profound appreciation to the non-aligned caucus and other friends in the Council for their support and good will and for the efforts they are making to ensure that the resolution the Council adopts at the end of the debate will clearly address the major concerns of our people.

139. The most pressing task for the Namibian patriots and the combatants of PLAN is to ensure that we leave no stone unturned as we forge ahead, knowing that the people's struggle will continue until final victory is achieved.

140. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

141. Mr. von SCHIRNDING (South Africa): May I convey to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations and our best wishes on your assumption of the presidency of the Council.

142. When I last addressed the Council on 23 May this year, I gave a full exposition of the South African Government's position regarding the question of South West Africa and that position remains unchanged.

143. In the meantime, in pursuance of the mandate given to him by the Council by virtue of resolution 532 (1983), the Secretary-General paid visits to South Africa and to South West Africa during August 1983, and the Council has before it his report [*S/15943*].

144. Let me say at the outset that this report accurately reflects the position of the South African Government as conveyed to the Secretary-General during his discussions in Cape Town. I should like to place on record the appreciation of my Government for the objective manner in which the Secretary-General has approached this task.

145. I wish now briefly to restate the South African Government's position on the matters raised during the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and South West Africa, which are the subject of the report before us.

146. The South African Government remains firmly committed to seeking a peaceful settlement of the South West Africa question on the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978), within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western contact group. It was in furtherance of that commitment that the South African Government agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General in order to attempt to resolve the remaining outstanding issues to be addressed in the context of resolution 435 (1978), namely, the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG.

147. As the Secretary-General's report confirms, these two issues have now been resolved as far as South Africa is concerned. In addition, certain outstanding matters regarding the agreement on the status of UNTAG were also resolved.

148. The result is that the Secretary-General has been able to report that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para. 24*] and that there had been, as he put it, "substantial progress" since the Council last met. I would hope that we shall therefore hear no further irresponsible allegations in the Council that South Africa is somehow responsible for delaying the implementation of a settlement, such as we have already, predictably, heard this afternoon.

149. There is now only one major issue to be resolved and that is the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola on the understanding that they will not be replaced by any other hostile forces. As is reflected in the Secretary-General's report, the position of the South African Government on this question is that it will not be possible to put into practice any settlement plan unless a clear agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal. The Government of South Africa is irrevocably committed on this issue. Firm agreement will have to be reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal and a commitment will have to be obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement. And I should add that the South African Government's position on the question of Cuban withdrawal is acknowledged and has support within the international community.

150. The Secretary-General has stated in his report that he does not accept the so-called linkage between a settlement in South West Africa and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. However, in his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General acknowledged that:

> "Furthermore, when East-West tension is superimposed on regional conflicts and serves to exacerbate them, the already destructive nature of such disputes is likely to be aggravated and the danger of widening strife becomes an ominous prospect."[4]

151. The presence of 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola is not a figment of South Africa's imagination. It is a fact. There is irrefutable evidence that SWAPO and FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Liberasión de Angola) forces are becoming increasingly integrated and the FAPLA forces are advised by Cubans. That is the linkage, and it takes a great deal of wishful thinking to deny that this connection exists.

152. SWAPO operates from Angola with active FAPLA and Cuban support. The relevance of the presence in

Angola of the Cuban forces is therefore indivisible from the efforts to put an end to conflict in the area and to establish long-term peace in the region. It is absurd to deny that the introduction of surrogate forces of the Soviet Union into southern Africa is not a cause for the gravest concern, not only to South Africa and South West Africa, but to all the countries of the region.

153. The members of the Council would surely not deny the commitment of the Soviet Union to world-wide revolution and the imposition of its own ideological system on other peoples and its openly proclaimed policy of supporting hostile action and subversion against South Africa and South West Africa. Its surrogate, Cuba, makes no secret of its efforts to destabilize its neighbours in Latin America and to export revolution wherever it can. Is further evidence necessary of the prohibitive and menacing effect which the Cuban presence in Angola has on the progress towards a peaceful settlement in the region?

154. I should like to reiterate that South Africa has consistently rejected resolutions of the General Assembly which have declared SWAPO to be the "sole and authentic representative of the people of South West Africa". Under no circumstances will South Africa now or in the future receive any representative of the United Nations in South West Africa on that basis. We are aware of the continuing bias in favour of SWAPO on the part of certain United Nations bodies, and I must emphasize once again that no settlement plan can be implemented unless the Secretary-General and his personnel act with strict impartiality. We have taken note of the assurances which the Secretary-General has provided in this connection in his report.

155. The South African Government fully supports the Secretary-General's sentiments that the attainment of a peaceful, prosperous and independent South West Africa would be an achievement of which all members of the international community could be proud. South Africa has given evidence of its willingness to co-operate in the attainment of this worthy goal. It is the baleful and ominous presence of the Soviet surrogate forces in Angola which prevents its realization.

156. Therefore, it would be futile for the Security Council to attempt to set any deadlines or time-frames for implementation until the matter of the Cuban presence in Angola has been resolved, and it should be understood that South Africa would not accept any such deadlines.

157. Finally, reference has been made this afternoon to the pre-emptive operation carried out against a terrorist target at Maputo by a small task-group of the South African Defence Force on 17 October.

158. The South African Government has given adequate warning to the Mozambique Government not to harbour or to grant facilities to terrorists and in so doing permit them to launch and plan attacks and aggression against South Africa.

159. During a tour of the terrorist target in Maputo organized for foreign correspondents by the Mozambican Information Ministry, a Mozambique Government document was discovered by journalists in the rubble of the terrorist headquarters, which was situated in a penthouse and a flat on the fourth floor of a building in Maputo. This document listed two South Africans residing in Maputo as "soldiers" and suggested that such terrorists were known to and aided by the Mozambique Government. Let me quote from the British Broadcasting Corporation's report of 18 October on the discovery of this document:

> "Most of the literature which we saw lying around in the debris was mainly anti-South African propaganda: books on reported left-wing causes, that kind of thing. There was also a bust of Lenin and various personal effects. But we did come across one document which referred to ANC soldiers—and we did question ANC officials about this, and there was considerable embarrassment, both among the officials themselves and among Mozambique security officers who presumably spent all day yesterday going through the office removing any incriminating evidence, if there was any such evidence there. And we questioned them about this reference to ANC soldiers, and first we were told that this referred to political soldiers, but then it was suggested that we ourselves had planted this document while we were walking around the offices."

160. It is from headquarters such as the one destroyed in the pre-emptive raid that acts of terror against civilian targets and the killing and maiming of blacks and whites in South Africa are planned, controlled and supported. The South African Government reiterates its warning that it will seek out and destroy such facilities, wherever they may be.

161. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Sierra Leone. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

162. Mr. KOROMA (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for acceding to my request to be invited to participate in the deliberations on this all-important matter, the question of Namibia.

163. Let me also express my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. My country enjoys excellent relations with Jordan, and I should like to assure you of our fullest co-operation as you carry out your onerous responsibilities. In the same vein, my delegation would like to acknowledge and pay a special tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for the commendable way in which he conducted the affairs of the Council last month.

164. While the United Nations has been seized of the question of Namibia since its inception, it was on 29 September 1978 that the Council, for the first time, put together a package with the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Council, in the form of resolution 435 (1978). The aim of that resolution was to ensure the peaceful transition of Namibia to independence. The United

Nations plan for a settlement of the Namibian situation, approved by that resolution, among other things called for a cease-fire agreement, the creation of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. When that resolution was adopted, the expectation was that, within a period of 18 months at the most, Namibia would achieve its independence. But today, five years later, that resolution has remained unimplemented, and Namibia—a United Nations Territory—is still under the illegal military occupation of South Africa.

165. Most regrettably, immediately following the adoption of that resolution, the South African Government cynically, and in defiance of the decision of the Council, started putting up one artificial obstacle after another, with the intention of frustrating implementation of the resolution and preventing the independence of Namibia.

166. But, even more alarming, and as if to provide succour and encouragement to the South African racists for their defiance of the will of the Council and, indeed, that of the international community as a whole, one of the permanent members of the Council, who had played the role of a *prima donna* in the negotiation and adoption of resolution 435 (1978), introduced matters extraneous to, or non-germane to, the contents of that resolution—to wit, the presence of Cuban internationalist forces in the sovereign and independent State of Angola. The intrusion of such an extraneous matter, or what has come to be known as the "linkage issue", has not only provided South Africa with a further pretext to sabotage the Namibia package but has in fact continued to hold the independence of Namibia and its people hostage to circumstances outside their control.

167. Thus when the United States Government, with the concurrence of the South African régime, insists that the independence of Namibia is contingent upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, this is like asking for a mortgage on the people and Territory of Namibia, which they are not in a position to deliver.

168. It is useful at this point to recall the circumstances that gave rise to the diplomatic efforts that resulted in the adoption by the Council of resolution 435 (1978). The African Group, with the overwhelming support of members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and indeed of the socialist countries, affirmed at that time that only effective, comprehensive and economic sanctions would influence the racist régime in Pretoria to relinquish its illegal control of Namibia. It is fair to say that we were lectured to the effect that only peaceful diplomatic efforts could bring about an equitable solution in Namibia.

169. Despite our serious doubts about such an approach, we reluctantly agreed to allow the Western five to undertake appropriate contacts with South Africa. One may ask: What is the pay-off for the moderation and understanding that has been shown by the African States, not even to mention the people of Namibia, during the past five or six years? We all know it to be a fact that Namibia, despite the intervening period, has not advanced towards its independence.

170. Significantly, after so many years we are again being told that we should exercise patience, and what is even more baffling is the assertion that progress is being made towards Namibian independence. Time and time again, when the Council is seized of the question of Namibia, members of the Western Five speak as if independence were around the corner in Namibia. But we know that these soothing expressions cannot be a substitute for the exercise of effective political will with a view to agreeing on comprehensive sanctions, which, in my delegation's view, could alone make the difference as far as the racist régime is concerned.

171. The people of Namibia are certainly not in a position to deliver a mortgage, as has been demanded of them. Angola is a sovereign, independent State, and must, free and unfettered, act in its own national interest as it sees fit.

172. Moreover, as the report of the Secretary-General clearly stated, the "linkage issue" is outside the ambit of resolution 435 (1978), calling for the independence of Namibia. In his excellent report the Secretary-General declared:

> "I have repeatedly made it clear that I do not accept this linkage and that the question of Cuban troops was not envisaged in resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para 25*].

Therefore, the linking of Namibia's independence with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is a serious travesty of justice, an unjust demand of the people of Namibia and a human tragedy. I again quote the report of the Secretary-General:

> "The people of Namibia . . . are suffering not only denial of their legitimate aspirations for genuine self-determination and independence, but from the effects of procrastination and the uncertainty of their future. . . . I have now witnessed at first hand their impatience and disillusionment." [*ibid., para. 26*]

173. The foregoing position is not oblivious to the need for the lessening of tension in southern Africa. The irony is that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia coupled with the "linkage issue" and the non-implementation of resolution 435 (1978) threatens international peace and security in the whole area, thus leading to instability and conflict in the whole of southern Africa, with South Africa itself carrying out unrelenting armed attacks and acts of aggression against neighbouring States, especially its wilful and criminal occupation of large parts of southern Angola.

174. On the other hand, faced with South Africa's intransigence and its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, SWAPO is left with no alternative but to intensify the armed struggle to liberate the Territory.

175. Again, as the Secretary-General stated in his report:

> "The instability and conflict generated by the failure to resolve this problem have had disastrous results for the neighbouring countries, and especially for Angola. . . . It is both highly damaging to the peoples and

Governments of the area and also a threat to the wider peace." [*ibid., para. 27.*]

176. If peace and stability are to return to that area, resolution 435 (1978) must be implemented unconditionally, and Namibia's independence must not be made contingent upon the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola.

177. We therefore call on the Council to assume its responsibility for the political fate of Namibia, for its decolonization and for its independence. We also call for the speedy and immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without any conditions.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23*, chap. VIII, sect. B, para. 17.

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

[2] See A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Res.105 (XIX).

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting, para. 18.

[4] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[5] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 14th meeting, paras. 5-8.

[6] *Ibid.*, paras. 9-11.

[7] *Ibid.*, 27th meeting, para. 85.

[8] *Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1*, p. 1.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00400 90-60205—February 1992—2,050

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-EIGHTH YEAR

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NOTE

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2482nd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 21 October 1983, at 10.30 a.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2482)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 11.25 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representative of Senegal to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the other members of the delegation of the Council to take places at the Security Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with the decision taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite Mr. Mueshihange to take a place at the Council table.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): In accordance with decisions taken at the 2481st meeting, I invite the representatives of Angola, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Oramas Oliva (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Kunda (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

5. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Botswana, the Federal Republic of Germany, Mozambique and Venezuela in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Legwaila (Botswana), Mr. van Well (Federal Republic of Germany), Mr. dos Santos (Mozambique) and Mrs. Coronel de Rodríguez (Venezuela) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16056, which contains the text of a note verbale dated 20 October from the Mission of Guinea to the President of the Council.

7. The first speaker is the representative of Angola, whom I invite to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

8. Mr. FIGUEIREDO (Angola): On behalf of my delegation, Sir, I ask you to accept our best wishes on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. I also take this opportunity to commend Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana on his work as President last month.

9. The general debate in the General Assembly has just ended. We have heard the enunciation of high principles, noble sentiments, profound beliefs, sacred creeds. We have heard rhetoric, shibboleths and dogma. We have also heard words of wisdom, solidarity and support. We have been presented with a number of documents and reports on various international problems and sources of tension and conflict.

10. However, crises continue to exist all over the world and show no sign of abatement. Many are, if anything, worse. One of the most serious problems threatening international peace and security is also one of the oldest before the United Nations—the illegal occupation of Namibia by the racist armed forces and Administration of South Africa. This occupation of the Territory of Namibia, this oppression of the people of Namibia, this exploitation of the human and natural resources of Namibia has, in recent years, undergone various processes and has been given different labels by the *apartheid* occupation régime of South Africa, all designed to make the occupation more palatable to the majority inhabitants of Namibia and more acceptable to critics. But the people of Namibia, led by their liberation movement, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), have rejected these attempts at deception, and progressive forces all over the world have denied the legitimacy sought by the *apartheid* régime for its illegitimate offspring—an extension racist régime in Windhoek.

11. Since 1978, the South African Administration has manipulated the situation in other, intricate ways: by giving false promises to the United Nations and false assurances to the international community, meanwhile remaining intransigent, buttressing its military presence in Namibia, increasing its economic power at home, acquiring a nuclear capability, and threatening the sovereign countries in southern Africa with acts of aggression and military adventurism and expansionism aimed at destabilizing their legitimate Governments.

12. An impartial look at the issues relating to Namibian independence also shows the almost limitless subterfuge and deception employed by the racist South African régime to buy time and acquire more sympathetic friends and administrations overseas.

13. Whenever all outstanding issues have been settled, Pretoria invents new ones to take their place. My delegation does not believe that the *apartheid* régime will end its illegal occupation of Namibia unless it is forced to do so. International consensus, pressure or censure will not force South Africa to move towards genuine independence for Namibia. If the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) is not set in motion in the very near future, there will be only two options available to the international community—the peaceful one, through imposition of sanctions and the withdrawal of Western political, economic and military support for the Pretoria régime, or a long-drawn-out armed struggle by SWAPO and the people of Namibia, with support of every type by their friends.

14. The position of Angola on Namibian independence has been stated succinctly on numerous occasions. The people, the Party and Government of Angola offer their total solidarity with, and support for, the people of Namibia and SWAPO, in keeping with the principles of our revolution and the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and in keeping with our commitment to freedom from imperialism, colonialism and racism, all of which are embodied in the Pretoria régime, which seeks to terrorize not only its own majority inhabitants but also much of southern Africa.

15. We reject manufactured and irrelevant demands, artificial linkages between completely unrelated issues and attempts to give the Pretoria régime precious time under the rubric of "constructive engagement", which, in fact, has enabled South Africa to become more belligerent in carrying out acts of armed aggression in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and other southern African States. This "constructive engagement" has allowed the racist armed forces of South Africa to engage in a destructive engagement in Angola and to extend Pretoria's illegal occupation of Namibia to parts of southern Angola.

16. The position of my Government on the problems in southern Africa has been stated on a number of occasions, most recently in the general debate, at the 27th meeting of the General Assembly. However, for the record in the Council I should like to reiterate the four points made on that occasion by President José Eduardo dos Santos; they represent the position of the MPLA-Workers Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido de Trabalho) and of the Government of Angola. The first requirement is the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops occupying our territory. Secondly, Council resolution 435 (1978) must be speedily implemented in order to steer Namibia to real independence. Thirdly, South Africa's attacks on Angola must cease. Fourthly, all logistic and military support given to the gangs of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) puppets terrorizing our towns must cease.

17. If Namibia is to win independence peacefully, the next and only step is the immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978), starting with a cease-fire, the emplacement of the United Nations Transition Assistance

Group (UNTAG), the withdrawal of South African troops and elections under United Nations supervision. As part of this process, the Pretoria régime should immediately announce its choice of electoral system and hold talks to fix a date for the cease-fire so that implementation of resolution 435 (1978) can commence.

18. The armed forces of South Africa must also immediately withdraw from all Angolan territory, part of which they have occupied since 1981, and pay compensation for the damage and destruction they have wrought—most recently in Cangamba, a town 400 kilometres inside Angolan territory.

19. I have been speaking thus far on the issue of Namibian independence, which is the issue before the Council. However, the representative of South Africa yesterday [*2481st meeting*] made an attempt to turn his statement into a discussion on what can be termed the South African occupation of parts of southern Angola.

20. The rules of procedure limit Council debates to the matter at hand but, since no one has raised a procedural objection, permit me to respond to some of the points raised in the statement of the representative of South Africa despite the fact that these clearly come under the mandate of another question of which the Council has been seized since 1978—that is, the question of South African aggression against Angola.

21. In 1975, even as our late President, Mr. Agostinho Neto, was announcing independence to a jubilant civilian crowd in Luanda, South African guns could be heard not too far from our capital. It was in response to the South African military invasion of Angola within hours of our birth as an independent Angola that we invited our friends, among them our Cuban friends, to assist us in fighting this fresh onslaught of imperialism. Thus, South Africa's racist attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola have nothing to do with the presence of Cubans in Angola or the question of Namibian independence, as the racists would have us believe. There has never been a single Angolan soldier on non-Angolan soil. Are we being told that we have no right to self-defence within our own borders and to be assisted by friends of our own choice at our own invitation? What about the pre-implementation talks held at Geneva in 1981, which also broke down because of Pretoria's intransigence? There was no reference to a Cuban presence in Angola at that time. It was not until mid-1981, after collusion between Pretoria and its Western allies, that the linkage was manufactured.

22. As for the Cuban presence in Angola being a cause for the gravest concern not only to South Africa but to "all the countries of the region", as the South African representative mentioned yesterday in his statement, perhaps he has not really understood the cause of the gravest concern in the region. It is the militarist and terrorist policies and actions and the genocide of the *apartheid* South African régime itself that are constantly referred to by every State in southern Africa in every forum, including the Council. If it is otherwise, I should certainly like to hear those countries speak for themselves.

23. The racist South African armed forces have mounted brutal attacks on all front-line States. Was that indeed also because of a Cuban presence in those countries? Were there Cuban troops in Lesotho? The racist régime has as many pretexts, excuses and rationales as there are *apartheid* laws.

24. The real reason is contained in the phrase used by the South African representative himself in referring to the inexcusable South African terrorist attack on Maputo recently. The representative referred to "the pre-emptive operation". And that is the key to all the racist régime's acts of aggression and terrorism both inside South Africa, against its majority inhabitants, and across its borders in Namibia and in other front-line States—pre-emptive operations against the genuine independence of Namibia; pre-emptive operations against the spread of freedom and liberation, even as former colonies regain independence; pre-emptive operations against the granting of the inalienable rights of the South African majority inhabitants; pre-emptive strikes against anything at all that threatens the racist *apartheid* State and structure of South Africa. The racist régime attempts to deceive the international community; yesterday it actually attempted to insult the intelligence of the Council members by presenting specious arguments.

25. The issue is not the Cuban presence. Angola is indeed an independent State. Certainly, the issue here is the independence of Namibia. The issue is not SWAPO bases, it is the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its exploitation as the fifth province of South Africa. The issue is not support for the freedom fighters of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC); it is the denial of human, civil, political and economic rights of South Africa's oppressed majority.

26. Those are the issues South Africa seeks to deny, reject or camouflage, as witness the statement yesterday by the representative of the racist régime.

27. To return to the issue before the Council, namely, the question of Namibia: as long as South Africa continues to get political and economic support from its friends, it will feel free to undertake with impunity acts of armed aggression in southern Africa and continue its occupation and exploitation of Namibia.

28. The Council must reject South Africa's intransigence in linking the independence of Namibia to irrelevant extraneous issues, and if South Africa fails to comply with relevant resolutions the Council should consider the adoption of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

A luta continua; a vitoria e certa.

29. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

30. Mr. RUPIA (United Republic of Tanzania): Mr. President, I wish first, on behalf of my delegation, to thank you and the other members of the Council for giving us an opportunity to participate in the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia. We are confident that your rich personal experience in the diplomatic field and your well-recognized talents will be put to full use in guiding the deliberations of the Council to a successful conclusion. Coming from a region so rife with conflict arising from the denial of a people's freedom and its right to a homeland, you are personally well aware of the magnitude of the suffering which can be imposed on a struggling people.

31. I should like also to join those who have spoken before me in paying a well deserved tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, who presided over the Council during the month of September, for a job well done.

32. Allow me also to express my Government's appreciation for the efforts of the Secretary-General in seeking a peaceful resolution of the Namibian problem. His visit to the region in fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to him by the Council in its resolution 532 (1983), gave him the opportunity to come in contact with the vivid realities and the human tragedy attendant on the continued occupation of Namibia. In particular, the visit vindicated our long-standing position that there can be no substitution for the central role of the United Nations in the search for a solution to the Namibian question nor can it be relegated to a secondary position.

33. The report of the Secretary-General [*S/15943*] equally confirmed what has always been our understanding of the current status of the negotiations in the context of Council resolution 435 (1978). The visit, therefore, thrashed out some of the positions which were hitherto muted.

34. This series of Council meetings has been convened in order to consider the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 532 (1983). In May this year, the Council met under very uncertain circumstances. It was convened in an attempt to salvage a great opportunity to bring to an end the colonization of Namibia, an opportunity that was gradually slipping away. Hence we saw the need for the Council to revive its resolve speedily to implement its plan for the independence of that Territory. The international community was trying to find ways to break the impasse which had been, and continues to be, imposed on the liberation of Namibia. It therefore saw fit to mandate the Secretary-General to initiate consultations with a view to securing the implementation of the plan. Considering that resolution 435 (1978) has been accepted by the parties involved, one would have expected these meetings to be convened for the purpose of triggering the implementation of the resolution. But to date, it is painfully clear that our realization of that objective is not so imminent.

35. When my delegation spoke before the Council in May [*2448th meeting*], we devoted our attention to showing why we thought it was regrettable that, after the extensive and exhaustive negotiations that had taken place, one of the parties to those negotiations would have chosen to turn its back on the agreement and hence on the independence of Namibia.

36. If the United Nations plan embodied in resolution 435 (1978) is still unimplemented it is because of a policy that has come to be known as "linkage" or "parallelism". Inherent in that policy are considerations which are inimical not only to the independence of Namibia but to the Charter of the United Nations. Indeed, they are inimical to the independence of Namibia because the policy seeks to link that independence to issues totally irrelevant to that purpose and outside the context of resolution 435 (1978), approving the United Nations plan. Apart from the rights of the Namibians, the insistence on linking the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is an interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

37. The decision of Angola regarding those troops is a sovereign prerogative of that State. It is consistent with the Charter and international law. No country has any right to violate the norms of international law. It is extortionist to make the implementation of Council resolutions contingent upon the satisfaction of geo-political preoccupations of any Member of the Organization, especially a permanent member of the Council. Council resolution 435 (1978) was negotiated and adopted as a framework for the achievement of the independence of Namibia. That and that alone, was its sole purpose. It did not and was not meant to encompass issues irrelevant to that objective and certainly not to be a vehicle of any Power or group of countries to obtain, by extortion, national foreign policy objectives otherwise unobtainable.

38. There can be no doubt that those who seek to pervert logic, falsify the truth and trample on the rights of peoples for ideological expediency, do not want peace in southern Africa. Those who go to great lengths to manufacture for South Africa excuses with which to justify aggression, even more than the *apartheid* authorities themselves, cannot claim to be agents of stability in the region. Rather, their actions seek to perpetuate instability and violence.

39. South Africa is occupying Namibia illegally. It occupies parts of Angola. Yet an attempt is being made to obscure the fact of the occupation of Namibia and Angola and instead to propel into predominance considerations that do not relate to the independence of Namibia or even to the security of the region, but seek to advance global cold-war ambitions. Why do we not hear condemnation of South Africa for its occupation of Angola? Why is it so difficult for the same friends of South Africa even to condemn *apartheid*, the real cause for the tension in that region?

40. We have repeatedly sought to impress upon the authors of the policy of linkage the fallacy of their position. In doing so, we have pointed out irrefutable facts in order to expose the fallacy of their position. Perhaps for emphasis it is worth while recalling certain incontrovertible facts.

41. When, in 1975, the *apartheid* régime invaded Angola to prevent the assumption of leadership of Angola by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), there were no Cuban forces in Angola. Then, as it is the case now, we did not hear any concerns about the security of Angola. Angola's appeal for help went largely unanswered. The Cuban Government was prepared to help. It is, therefore, a fact that the stationing of Cuban troops in Angola was precipitated by South African aggression. Their presence is made more necessary today by that continuing aggression.

42. Between 1975 and 1982 eight years elapsed. During that period a series of diplomatic initiatives to secure the peaceful independence of Namibia were launched. These initiatives culminated in the adoption of Council resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) and the convening of the ill-fated pre-implementation meeting at Geneva in 1981, as well as the proximity talks in 1982. South Africa participated fully in all these negotiations, and all this time the Cuban troops remained in Angola. Yet, as my delegation has had occasion to observe before in the Council, at no point did South Africa raise the question of those troops, let alone link them in any manner to the negotiations on the independence of Namibia. The régime itself was aware that its armed aggression against and occupation of Angola necessitated that presence. Instead, linkage—a product of the policy of constructive engagement—was introduced and quickly attributed to South Africa.

43. Even if we were to accept that it is South Africa that now insists on linkage, there can be no doubt whatsoever that this policy, while conveniently embraced by that régime, was engineered by the United States. In this regard, even those other members of the contact group that have failed to disassociate themselves from this policy of linkage are accomplices in this scheme to deny freedom to the people of Namibia. For it is this insistence on linkage, and this alone, which has deadlocked progress on the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). It is thus unfair, and the ultimate in insincerity, for any party to the negotiations on the independence of Namibia to attempt, even remotely, to ascribe responsibility to Angola. Above all, it is futile to try to exonerate the *apartheid* régime of its culpability, or to create justification for it.

44. It is important that the Council not be derailed into consideration of fictitious issues. That is a diversionary ploy aimed at deflecting the international focus from the real issues. The issues at hand are those of *apartheid* in South Africa, the illegal occupation of Namibia, and the acts of destabilization against the independent African States neighbouring the *apartheid* régime, including the occupation of Angola's territory. No one can seriously claim the existence of any other relevant issue. While this series of Council meetings is called to consider the issue of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa, we hope that those who champion security in southern Africa will participate fully in convening other meetings of the Council to consider those other problems which are threatening international peace and security.

45. South Africa has escalated its violence. Apart from its occupation of Angolan territory, it has mounted a campaign of destabilization of other neighbouring independent African States. Lesotho is today a victim of economic sabotage and blockade for giving humanitarian assistance to the refugees of *apartheid*; Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana and even far-removed countries like Seychelles have fallen victim to South African aggression. South Africa recruits, trains and finances bandits and mercenaries to carry out its military incursions into these countries. As recently as Monday, 17 October, the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, was attacked in what has become a pattern of destabilization contemptuously aimed at coinciding with any action by the international community to censure the *apartheid* régime. Every series of Council meetings to consider the question of Namibia has been accompanied by an act of aggression by South Africa. The adoption of resolution 435 (1978) was preceded by the Cassinga massacre on 4 May 1978; the Cuamato attack was timed to coincide with the disruption of the pre-implementation meeting in January 1981; the Maseru raid was timed to deflect the attention of the international community from South Africa's non-implementation of the United Nations plan on Namibia.

46. There cannot possibly be in this regard any legitimate concern of the *apartheid* régime or of any other country to which the international community must address itself. There can be no consideration of any so-called regional issues outside the context of the independence of Namibia, the ending of acts of destabilization by South Africa and the abolition of the diabolical system of *apartheid*, for it is these issues which inherently pose threats of peace and security to the region and the world as a whole.

47. If we speak in those terms, it is to underscore the indignation of the international community. It is to underscore the pain of seeing a people colonized, part of a country occupied, and the victims being told that freedom cannot come, sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be restored, unless the perpetrator of the very vile crimes is rewarded; of their being told that, though all issues relating to Council resolution 435 (1978) have been resolved, implementation of that resolution cannot commence.

48. The Council, therefore, must be categorical in condemning and rejecting linkage. It cannot afford to equivocate on such a diversionary idea, which seeks to undermine the authority and integrity of this body. Above all, the Council cannot afford to equivocate on the independence of Namibia.

49. It is clear that it is South Africa that poses a threat to international peace and security, and continued insistence on linkage will have the effect of perpetuating the threat. To buy time for South Africa to entrench its illegal occupation of Namibia, to create excuses for that régime to continue its occupation of parts of Angola, will only poison the possibility of bringing about peace and security in the region. It is a matter of public record that the international community has rejected and condemned the policies of parallelism or linkage. the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU have all rejected outright

the premise and content of the policy of linkage. The least the Council can do is also to reject linkage.

50. Likewise, the Council must reaffirm both the central role of the United Nations in the search for a settlement of the question of Namibia and the continuing validity of resolution 435 (1978) as the only framework for such a settlement. These two factors remain central to any action that may be taken on Namibia.

51. Similarly, it is clear that no issue relevant to resolution 435 (1978) remains outstanding. The report of the Secretary-General is very clear on this. The Council must, therefore, require South Africa to communicate, within a prescribed time-frame, its choice of the electoral system to be used in the election of the Constituent Assembly so that the Council can proceed with the adoption of the enabling resolution triggering the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978).

52. The Council must also be categorical in its resolve to ensure that its resolutions are implemented. It should send clear signals to the *apartheid* régime that it must either co-operate and facilitate the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) or face the institution of appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

53. I cannot conclude without paying a well-deserved tribute to SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people. Its sense of statesmanship, enduring even the prevarication of the *apartheid* régime, attests to its commitment to peaceful settlement. Africa's resolve to see Namibia free is irrevocable. No threat, of whatever magnitude, can deter Africa from that objective. We pledge our unflinching support to the combatants of SWAPO in the prosecution of the struggle.

54. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Yugoslavia. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

55. Mr. GOLOB (Yugoslavia): I wish first of all to extend to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of October. We are happy to have you, the representative of a friendly and non-aligned country and a man of diplomatic experience and skill, at the helm of the Council during its consideration of the question of Namibia. Under your wise guidance the Council will, we believe, be able to address itself to this important question in a constructive and decisive manner.

56. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor as President of the Council for the month of September, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, on the exemplary manner in which he conducted the work of the Council.

57. These meetings of the Council are in our view, a logical, necessary and timely sequel to the meetings held in May and June of this year. Those meetings were attended by a number of ministers for foreign affairs of non-aligned countries who expressed in the Council the position taken jointly at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983. At the 2446th meeting of the Council, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, Mr. Lazar Mojsov, emphasized that the question of Namibia is not only an African problem but a global problem as well, one involving the basic principles on which international relations are founded. He further stated that foreign domination in Namibia, as anywhere else, poses a direct threat to international peace and security, and he concluded by saying that resistance of foreign domination in Namibia and elsewhere is a pre-condition for safeguarding peace and security.

58. In resolution 532 (1983) adopted on 31 May 1983, the Council mandated the Secretary-General to resolve, in direct consultations with the parties in conflict, the outstanding questions relevant to the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and to report to the Council within the prescribed time-frame.

59. The Secretary-General, acting in a dedicated manner, fulfilled his mandate promptly and reported that all the outstanding issues relevant to resolution 435 (1978) had been resolved. The sole undetermined issue has been the choice of the electoral system, and since it has been left to South Africa to choose either one of the two systems proposed, it is not the issue where agreement is pending. It must therefore be considered resolved.

60. The report of the Secretary-General has shown, however, that South Africa continues to insist on linkage between the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and an irrelevant and extraneous issue—the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. South Africa is thereby obstructing the independence of Namibia and imposing a condition upon it that was never contemplated by the Council when it adopted resolution 435 (1978).

61. What is then necessary is that the Council resolutely and categorically reject linkage or any other condition alien to resolution 435 (1978). We believe it is the Council's duty to do so in order to remain faithful to its own decision and to deny South Africa the opportunity of insisting on something that is in no way whatsoever connected with the United Nations plan. The Council should, we believe, confirm that the plan is the only basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian problem, thus removing any grounds for any present or future attempts of the racist régime to find excuses for its obstruction of the implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

62. That done, and bearing in mind that all outstanding issues germane to that resolution have been resolved, the Council should finally set in motion the United Nations plan. It is our opinion that the request to make known its choice of electoral system promptly should be addressed to South Africa, after which the envisaged procedure of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) could begin.

63. We believe that it is the responsibility of the Council to act promptly and decisively for several compelling reasons. First, it has to avert the mounting threat to security

in southern Africa brought about by the racist régime's constant policy of aggression against the destabilization of neighbouring African States from the Territory of Namibia before the point of explosion is reached and international peace and security at large are endangered. There could not be any better example, to our mind, of the often-suggested preventive functioning of the Council than a prompt implementation of the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia.

64. Secondly, the international community, and therefore the Council, has a responsibility to bring to an end the long suffering and the sacrifices of the Namibian people and its sole and authentic representative, the liberation movement, SWAPO. The demand that freedom finally be given to Namibia is universal, and the Council has the duty to act in accordance with it.

65. Thirdly, the victims of the constant aggressive actions of the Pretoria racist régime—in particular Angola, as well as Lesotho, Mozambique and other front-line States—should finally be enabled to live in peace and security so that they can turn to the pressing problems of their economic and social development. It is impermissible that the independence and sovereignty of those countries should be permanently violated. It is indeed impermissible that South Africa should be left to continue to occupy parts of Angolan territory, to kill Angolan people at will and to destroy the infrastructure of that country with total impunity and then even attempt to shift to Angola the heavy responsibility for preventing the implementation of the United Nations plan that South Africa itself bears. The international community must not allow that situation to continue and must urgently create the conditions in which the unbearable aggression against Angola would cease.

66. For all those reasons, there is the greatest urgency in the request heard at this table for the Council to proceed with the implementation of the United Nations plan. South Africa should be called upon to communicate to the Secretary-General its choice of electoral system without any further delay; and the Secretary-General would then report to the Council as soon as possible, after which the Council would proceed with the adoption of the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan.

67. The importance of a prompt decision along these lines also resides in the message that the Council would thus be sending to South Africa—that is, that the Council would no longer tolerate South Africa's obstruction of the implementation of the resolution. By so doing, the Council would be acting in accordance with the pressing need to safeguard the prestige and effectiveness of the world Organization and its central role on the question of Namibia.

68. In the event that South Africa should continue to flout the will of the international community, and if the report of the Secretary-General confirms that fact, my delegation will, as it has done in the past, support any measure aimed at exerting pressure on South Africa, including the appropriate measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. It is our opinion that an economic boycott of South Africa on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions should be applied by all countries. May I remind the Council that such a measure was helpful in the struggle for independence of Zimbabwe, and there is no reason to believe that the same would not hold true for Namibia?

69. In all regions of the world independence is the overriding request. In a growing number of countries there is an ever-stronger resistance to foreign domination and occupation, so much so that it is becoming an ever more essential element of the present state of affairs of the world. No authentic liberation struggle has ever been defeated, and the Namibian people will win their struggle and achieve their independence.

70. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Mozambique. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

71. Mr. DOS SANTOS (Mozambique): Allow me, Sir, to begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council this month. I am sure that under your leadership our discussions will be very successful and bring nearer the day when the people of Namibia will be able to enjoy, like the peoples of many independent countries, including your own, its birthright: freedom, independence, justice and democracy.

72. I should like to take this opportunity also to congratulate your predecessor for the able and serene manner in which he conducted the affairs of the Council during the turbulent month of September.

73. Similarly, the Secretary-General deserves my appreciation for his untiring dedication to the Organization.

74. The adoption of Council resolution 435 (1978) meant for the people of Namibia, and indeed the world at large, that Namibia's independence was just around the corner, that it was just a matter of a few months. The cheese of hope has been and continues to be deliberately dangled near the nose of freedom-loving people in such a way as to make them think that sooner rather than later they will be able to eat it. But is was never meant to be eaten. This is how we should interpret the situation we are facing now. Lengthy and protracted discussions ensued after the adoption of resolution 435 (1978). At one point during the nursing period, and later, as time went by, it became abundantly clear that the child's father—or mother, if you wish—not only was unprepared to feed him or her but was also ready to abandon the child to his or her fate. The five-year-old negotiation was marked by a process whereby road-block after road-block was erected by the father on the child's way to the dining room. But when the child, under the care of his or her stepmother, grew strong—to the chagrin of his or her father—the latter attempted to inject a lethal fluid into the child's body, although the father continued publicly to claim that he loved his child.

This fluid goes by the name of "linkage" or "parallelism". Let me say it as bluntly as I can: In legal terms, this is called attempted murder. The accused is generally known as the contact group. Africa—and, indeed, the whole world—is being invited to be an accomplice to this dastardly act.

75. Appeasing and embracing South Africa has only increased its stubbornness and brought untold suffering not only to the people of Namibia and South Africa itself but also to all independent neighbouring countries. Within the framework of this policy, we have seen increased diplomatic, political, economic, military and even nuclear cooperation between some Western countries and *apartheid* South Africa. Far from inhibiting racist South Africa and increasing its isolation, this policy has allowed it to attack its neighbours, with little reaction from the international community of nations.

76. Having assured itself of diplomatic cover in international forums, the licences and patents necessary to manufacture weapons, and supplies of war *matériel*, the racist South African régime has been able, through a belligerent and expansionist policy, to arrogate to itself the right to carry out repeated acts of aggression against its neighbours, to attack militarily any country in Africa, to continue its illegal occupation of Namibia, to obstruct Namibia's independence, to strengthen its repugnant and obnoxious *apartheid* system, to destabilize front-line States and to invade and occupy part of Angolan territory.

77. Only a few days ago Mozambique was once again a victim of this aggressive nature of *apartheid* South Africa, when explosive devices placed by racist South African agents in an apartment building in Maputo went off, wounding five people. This was a barbaric, unprovoked attack against innocent people who were resting after a hard week's work, and constitutes a blatant, gross violation both of Mozambique's sovereignty and of international law and practice.

78. The attack came at a time when racist South Africa was under increasing pressure both at home and abroad on account of its criminal and abominable policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination. At home the struggle against *apartheid* is being successfully intensified, but there is also growing dissension within the ruling party. The so-called constitutional reforms will shortly be brought to a vote, so the faction espousing them would like to take a firm stand and thus bolster its position. If South Africa can blame outsiders for its problems, so much the better.

79. In the rest of the world, South Africa's position is not a rosy one. During the general debate in the General Assembly, for instance, speaker after speaker condemned South Africa's policy. This will later be repeated in meetings of the Assembly and its main Committees, and is taking place now in the Council, as was only to be expected.

80. It should be remembered that whenever South Africa is under great pressure its response is always the same. South Africa has shown in the past that it is not in favour of peaceful relations with its neighbours, and I am convinced that the international community will take the necessary steps to stop South African aggression.

81. Yesterday [*2481st meeting*] a racist South African spokesman made allegations too wild to deserve any serious consideration. Since I harbour the greatest respect for the Council, I shall not waste its valuable time in trying to comment on all those allegations. I should like just to touch in passing upon some facts.

82. *Apartheid* South Africa is fond of alleging the existence of ANC military bases in Maputo, and of launching attacks against them. On a number of occasions when those attacks have occurred, members of the diplomatic corps accredited in Mozambique and journalists from all over the world have immediately been shown the attacked places, and the so-called bases have turned out to be a nursery school, a fruit-juice and jam factory, and some houses. Despite these facts, the Pretoria régime has continued, as in the past, to label these places as military bases, and it will continue to do so tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Allegations or insinuations about ANC military bases existing in Mozambique represent nothing but a sad concoction of a sick mind.

83. My Government has the right and, indeed, the duty to take all—I repeat, all—necessary measures to preserve Mozambique's national independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty and to defend its people from these murderous acts. The Council may wish to take good note of that.

84. An obvious attempt is clearly being made to turn accepted, normal moral values upside down. Those who deliberately try to reward the aggressor and punish the victims, to glorify the illegal and vilify the legal, will have to accept responsibility for whatever may happen, and will have no one to blame but themselves.

85. Namibia's independence and the presence of any foreign forces in Angola at the invitation of a legal and recognized Government are two separate and unrelated issues. Any insistence on relating the two issues constitutes a flagrant, gross and grotesque interference in the internal affairs of a free, independent and sovereign State, Angola. Any fraternal forces now present in Angola—and I say it time and again—are there at the invitation of the Angolan Government, to help it defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as envisaged in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. They are not there for any offensive purpose whatsoever.

86. On the other hand, Namibia's independence is an issue: it is a colonial question. Namibia must be decolonized, and its people must regain their freedom and independence without any impediment or hindrance. We who claim to be democracies must not, under whatever pretext, deny the Namibian people their right to exercise democracy lest we jeopardize and place a big question mark over our own democracies.

87. Linkage is a clumsy fabrication, deliberately presented in order to create a vicious circle: "Namibia", they say, "cannot be allowed to attain its independence until some forces are removed from Angola. On the other hand, we are doing everything possible to maintain those forces by attacking and occupying parts of Angolan territory, so that we can justify the denial of independence to Namibia." The vicious circle is drawn. Namibia remains unfree.

88. South Africa aims to create and maintain a *cordon sanitaire* around its borders. It will continue trying to demonstrate to its own people that all the woes resulting from *apartheid* policies actually stem from nothing but outside interference. What South Africa fears most is the example an independent Namibia could constitute for the people of South Africa, by way of encouraging them in their struggle for the total eradication of the *apartheid* system.

89. In the light of the foregoing, I remain convinced that the Council will: denounce and reject linkage, as it is deeply repugnant and offensive, and completely extraneous to resolution 435 (1978); demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of racist South African troops from Namibia; immediately take the necessary steps leading to Namibia's independence; and secure the conditions that will make *apartheid* South Africa relinquish its stranglehold on Namibia, through such steps as rigorous application and extension of the arms embargo, comprehensive, mandatory sanctions, denial of nuclear assistance, and disinvestment.

90. It is not enough to condemn *apartheid* as morally wrong. The international community should be prepared to take concrete steps to show its aversion and opposition to the racist doctrine of the South African régime. It is high time we backed up our opposition to *apartheid* with deeds as well as words and distanced ourselves from this abominable policy.

91. Whether we like it or not, the people of Namibia will be free. The Council can, and indeed must, do a great deal in that process. The train of freedom and independence is moving on to freedom and independence. The overwhelming majority of mankind is on board. I hope that no one will wish to jump out. Should there be a few who would like to do that, they are free to do so as long as they make no effort to derail the train. Let Namibia be free today, not tomorrow.

92. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the Deputy Minister for External Relations of Cuba. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make a statement.

93. Mr. ORAMAS OLIVA (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): First of all, Sir, I should like to extend to you the congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Council, which once again falls to a country that is a friend of ours and is non-aligned. At this time I also wish to express our appreciation to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for the wise manner in which he conducted the proceedings of the Council.

94. In 1983, the Council on many occasions, as required in the defence of the loftiest principles of mankind, had to deal with the question of Namibia in view of the lack of results achieved in that regard. Once again this United Nations body is dealing with this question and discussing the illegality of South Africa's continued possession of the Territory of Namibia and the negative consequences of its occupation.

95. Perhaps never before has world public opinion confronted with so much persistence, moral grandeur and political realism the task of achieving such an obviously just and necessary goal as the independence of Namibia, which is called for by resolution 435 (1978). Perhaps never before has the international community been so consistently flouted and the resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly spurned in such open violation of the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations as by the racist régime of *apartheid*.

96. As is clearly stated under item 36 in the annotated preliminary list of items to be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth regular session of the General Assembly:

> "Since the adoption by the General Assembly at its first session, in 1946, of resolution 65 (I), the question of Namibia (formerly South West Africa) has been on the agenda of every regular session, of the fifth and ninth special sessions and of the eighth emergency special session of the Assembly. During the period, several subsidiary bodies of the Assembly have examined the situation relating to the Territory, including the *Ad Hoc* Committee on South West Africa, the Good Offices Committee on South West Africa, the Special Committee for South West Africa and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The question has also been the subject of a number of resolutions of the Security Council . . . In addition, the International Court of Justice has examined and delivered opinions on related aspects of the question . . ."[1]

97. As far back as 1966, the Assembly, in its resolution 2145 (XXI), terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa, which is now called Namibia, the name adopted by the Assembly, in its resolution 2372 (XXII), in accordance with the desires of the Namibian people.

98. It is now 17 years since that decision was taken by the General Assembly but, in spite of the many resolutions that have been adopted in the interim, the question of Namibia seems to be in a state of stagnation.

99. In spite of the existence of Council resolution 435 (1978), which offered prospects for the long-awaited independence of Namibia, and in spite of the reaffirmation by the General Assembly in 1981, at its eighth emergency special session [*resolution ES-8/2*], that that resolution was "the only basis for a peaceful settlement" and that it was necessary to begin immediately the unconditional implementation of that resolution "without any prevarication,

qualification or modification", the present situation with regard to Namibia is rather sombre.

100. The racist régime of Pretoria stubbornly refuses to implement the decisions of the international community and grant independence to Namibia. Can it be that for the people of Namibia, who have suffered so much, there are no human rights? Or is it that complicity in this crime requires an ambivalent attitude and requires that the clamouring of a people yearning for freedom be silenced? How much longer can South Africa continue to impose its racist order on Namibia?

101. The stubborn persistence of the racist régime of South Africa and its defiance of the Organization and of the States belonging to it are supported by the encouragement it receives from the Government of the United States as it endeavours to delay independence for the people of Namibia.

102. To what is this stubborn resistance due? What reasons, interests and strategies comprise the intransigent position of the racist régime? What forces make it possible for it to defy the Organization and ignore with impunity international agreements?

103. Namibia is a vast Territory with bountiful natural resources and a strategic geographical location, which explains the long history of colonial occupation and oppression of the Namibian people and its territory, considered one of the richest of the African continent.

104. Another of the factors that have made Namibia very valuable in the imperialist strategy is that it has rich uranium resources, whose extraction and consumption are managed by transnational corporations, which, together with South Africa, have been using it to develop their nuclear industry for military purposes. According to the 1980 report of the United Nations Council for Namibia, Namibia's uranium production is 5,000 tons a year.

105. It is interesting that the main limitation on the development of mining in Namibia is the lack of water. In this land of scanty and irregular rainfall, water is costly and its supply is uneven. When Angola was still a Portuguese colony, South Africa signed an agreement with the Government in Lisbon in 1969 to build hydro-electric complexes in Calueque and Ruacaná.

106. The two Governments wanted to bring in thousands of Portuguese and white Namibian or South African settlers, with a twofold objective—economic and political. The presence of the white settlers in those vast, thinly-populated lands would make difficult the actions of the revolutionary movements in Angola against Portuguese colonial domination and the actions of SWAPO, the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.

107. What are the Nazi racists in Pretoria and their allies in Washington trying to do? To try to overthrow the revolutionary processes in Angola and Mozambique and to bind the countries of the area to their economic interests is not new, as we know: it is an old plan. For this purpose they train and give logistic support to the bandits of UNITA and of the mis-named Mozambique Movement of National Resistance. They wish to destabilize the progressive countries of southern Africa, and they will use any means to this end.

108. South Africa's advanced state of nuclear development, achieved with the help of Western capitalist countries and the United States, is a serious potential threat to the countries of Africa, principally those of southern Africa. It is no mere coincidence that when the General Assembly considered the question of Israeli nulcear armament at its thirty-seventh session it called on the Secretary-General, in co-operation with the OAU and the League of Arab States, in resolution 37/82, to follow closely the nuclear and military collaboration between Israel and South Africa.

109. There remain on the conscience of mankind the terrible massacres perpetrated by the South African criminal hordes in Cassinga in 1980; in Cangamba in 1983; in Angola, in Niazonia in 1976 and in Chimolho in 1977; the brutal aggressions in Matola, in Maputo itself, the capital of the sister republic of Mozambique, in 1982 and 1983; and the massacre in Lesotho in 1983, in the capital of that small, fraternal kingdom, carried out on the pretext of a punitive action against ANC militants. In the past few days these cowardly actions have been repeated in Maputo. They are clear expressions of the way in which international responsibility is regarded by the repudiated *apartheid* régime, whose ferocious, primitive claws were shown yesterday in the outrageous statement of its representative to the Council.

110. Namibia's independence process is again at an impasse, caused by the obstinacy of the United States Administration and the South African régime. The recent journey to South Africa of the Secretary-General, within the framework of his mandate to consult the parties, conferred on him by resolution 532 (1983), made clear the South African Government's insistence on making the beginning of the process of Namibian independence dependent on the question of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola—that is, on the so-called linkage. But this is not the sole link; it has two more in hand: that MPLA should negotiate with UNITA and that the front-line countries should cease supporting ANC. These are sophistries, pretexts, which betray greed and an urge to impose its own order—the new order of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

111. In 1974, 1973, 1972, 1971 and even before that, there were no Cuban internationalists in Angola. The country was controlled by the Portuguese colonial army, which was certainly a close friend of the Pretoria racists. What was there then to prevent South Africa's withdrawal from the Territory of Namibia, occupied then, as today, illegally? This question should be put to the Pretoria racists in any future consultations.

112. Cuba vigorously rejects the attempt to link the presence of its troops on Angolan territory with the independ-

ence of Namibia and, like the overwhelming majority of States represented at the United Nations, considers that the presence of Cuban troops in Angola results from a sovereign agreement between two independent States and is therefore not a matter to be negotiated with third parties.

113. United States imperialism has tried in vain to present this just position of principle, based on international law, as an obstacle to Namibia's independence, attempting to conceal the fact that what is an obstacle to Namibia's independence and a threat to international peace is the occupation of part of Angolan territory by South African troops, in open, flagrant violation of the principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the independence of a State legally constituted and recognized by the international community under international law and the Charter.

114. The declaration signed on 4 February 1982 by the Ministers for Foreign Relations of Cuba and Angola sets forth, in its first paragraph, defence of the principle of sovereignty, as reflected in agreements between Cuba and Angola, based on Article 51 of the Charter. In its article 9 it clearly states that:

> "If the self-sacrificing struggle of SWAPO, the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people, and the demands of the international community succeeded in bringing about a genuine solution of the problem of Namibia, based on strict compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 435 (1978), and led to a truly independent Government and the complete withdrawal of the South African occupying troops to the other side of the Orange River, thus considerably diminishing the danger of aggression against Angola, the Angolan and Cuban Governments would consider the resumption of the implementation of the programme for the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban forces within a time-frame to be agreed upon by both Governments."

115. No one is unaware that United Nations resolutions would have been implemented and the suffering of the Namibian people would have ended long ago if South Africa did not enjoy the political, economic, military and diplomatic support of the main capitalist Powers, first and foremost, the United States, whose transnational corporations play a major role in the exploitation of Namibia. Without that support South Africa could not maintain its undeclared war against the front-line countries, especially against Angola. For that reason, the South African Government has been carrying out a policy of genocide and destruction, of economic sabotage and indiscriminate bombing of the peace-loving peoples of southern Angola. In a most brazen manner, the South African racist troops continue to occupy parts of Angolan territory, in open defiance of the agreements and appeals of the United Nations and world public opinion.

116. In just 10 months of 1983, the brutality of the *apartheid* régime has led to 323 violations of Angolan air space, seven air attacks on units of FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Liberação de Angola), three air attacks on the defenceless civilian population and two criminal attacks on SWAPO refugee camps. During the same period there were helicopter drops in Angolan territory and two land attacks. Many of these criminal actions were shamelessly carried out by the South African army from the illegally occupied territory of Angola.

117. Not satisfied with those direct attacks against Angola, with the open and brazen support of the Reagan Administration, South Africa continues to support the criminal activities of counter-revolutionary bands of UNITA. The strategic objective of this policy of force is to delay the process of Namibian independence as long as possible in order to strengthen the puppet parties of Namibia and thus undermine the position of SWAPO in any future Government.

118. All these manoeuvres were supported by a strong diversionary campaign against our military presence in Angola, and the repeated statements by the spokesmen of the State Department and the Prime Minister of South Africa, all reaffirming the policy followed by the Reagan Administration of portraying the solution of the conflict within the general framework of East-West confrontation.

119. America's stubbornly held position, which has received strong support from South Africa, has repeatedly been rejected by the Heads of State and Government of the front-line States and by SWAPO, as was reflected in the final communiqué of the Lusaka meeting on 4 September 1982, which revealed distinct differences of opinion on the subject among the members of the Western contact group.

120. The firm rejection by the front-line States was expressed emphatically in the meeting of the Liberation Committee in Harare on 20 February 1983, during the visit of the Secretary-General, and by other African countries too, which have reiterated that the solution of the problem of Namibia falls within the sole jurisdiction of the United Nations.

121. In turn, by a broad consensus, the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, clearly reaffirmed that position of the African countries.

122. Other important events occurred in the first half of 1983. Various governmental bodies, progressive organizations and committees throughout the world, as well as the International Conference in Solidarity with the Front-line States, held at Lisbon from 25 to 27 March, and the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence held in Paris from 25 to 29 April, all confirmed that the position of the African countries enjoys broad representative support.

123. In expressing our profound concern over the situation that has been created in Namibia and in the front-line countries by racist South Africa, Cuba believes that it is the duty of the United Nations to assume its full responsibility so as to prevent the outbreak of a catastrophe in

southern Africa. South Africa must be forced to abide by international law, and there is no alternative but to apply broad, binding sanctions, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

124. We take our responsibility very seriously, and by our determined action we wish to prevent the continuation of a process that has already caused death, suffering and misery. "To view a crime calmly is to commit that crime", declared the forger of our independence, José Martí. The Council must not by its inaction continue to be an accessory to the crime that has been committed against Namibia.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

NOTE

[1] See A/38/100.

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Litho in United Nations, New York 00300 90-60205—February 1992—2,050